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ABSTRACT 
 
PRICE OF EMPIRE: 
BRITAIN’S MILITARY COSTS DURING THE SEVEN YEARS’ WAR 
(May 2010) 
 
Jeremy Land, B.S., Appalachian State University 
M.A., Appalachian State University 
Thesis Chairperson: Dr. Jari Eloranta 
 This thesis examines difficult problems faced by all sovereign nations at one point or 
another: military expenditures and public debt. With current debt and military spending 
issues commanding attention from nearly all political entities, engaging in a discussion of 
historical events with similar situations and problems can be useful in a variety of ways. This 
work is an attempt to participate in the debate on an aspect of history often overlooked by 
historians. Though there is a large amount of scholarship on recent military spending and 
debt crises, little exists that examines the Seven Years’ War and its impact on Britain’s debt. 
The thesis argues that the war left Britain with historically high debt and a much larger 
empire that was difficult to consolidate.  
 Further, this work examines the reasons for the high cost of the war.  Though there 
are numerous reasons for it, some had more impact than others. Most wars of the period saw 
heavy action on the continent of Europe, and the Seven Years’ War was no exception. 
However, the North American continent became a major theater of conflict for the first time 
in its history, funded more directly by the British government. Because of this addition, 
transportation costs became a more pronounced issue than in previous wars. Beyond the 
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obvious naval aspect, the frontier of North America was dense and difficult to travel; forcing 
contingents of soldiers to take more time and spend large sums of money traveling. 
Furthermore, Native Americans were given gifts and military supplies by British officials in 
an effort to find support in their war against France. All these factors, and many more, 
extended Britain’s national debt to historically high levels. Because of that debt, British 
politicians looked to recover those monies spent on the war by taxing their colonies 
throughout the globe. Unfortunately, the American colonies were not happy with this 
development and it led to their rebellion and subsequent independence. Though the Seven 
Years’ War is not the only cause of the American War of Independence, it contributed 
directly to the onset of the rebellion. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
During the 18
th
 century, the British Empire spread across the globe. Britain’s 
wealthiest colonies during the 1700s were the thirteen located on the Atlantic coast of North 
America. The colonies were occupied by European settlers and allowed to operate nearly 
independently from the Crown. However, the inhabitants were extremely aggressive in 
expanding their own territory. At the same time, the French Empire stretched from Louisiana 
to the Hudson Bay, including Canada and areas west of the Appalachian Mountains. The 
French were mainly fur traders and trappers and maintained trade relationships with the 
Native Americans in both zones of influence. The Appalachian Mountains served as a natural 
barrier between British and French interests, but the British consistently pushed the boundary 
and encroached on French territory, creating a political, diplomatic and military crisis.  
 The crisis erupted when the colonies attempted to settle the issue by maintaining that 
the lands in Ohio territory belonged to the British Empire. As such, British colonists had the 
right to settle the land. The French had already moved into the region and established good 
working relationships with many of the Native American tribes living there. They established 
military outposts and forts all across the region. As a result, the French refused to recognize 
British claims to the area. A young Virginian, George Washington, was sent on a military 
expedition in the summer of 1754 to coerce the French into accepting the British land claims. 
This expedition was decisively defeated. Consequently, the colonies called on the British 
government to intervene. In response to the colonists’ pleas, Parliament sent General Edward 
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Braddock to confront the French forces in the disputed territory. The French and their Indian 
allies humiliated the British force, killing Braddock in the process.
1
 
 All the myths and legends that surround Braddock’s defeat notwithstanding, the result 
remained the same: France and Britain were at war. Both states had large empires, which 
meant that the war was fought on a global scale. North America became perhaps the most 
hotly contested region during the war, both on the continent and on the oceans. The war 
brought the two largest navies in the world into a contest to decide the fate of North America 
and determine who would rule the oceans for the next century and a half. Furthermore, the 
war would create the opportunities and situations that would lead to the American 
Revolution. Though Britain defeated France and removed her from North America, the 
British Empire paid for every inch of soil it conquered. Thus, the high military spending 
associated with the war nearly doubled Britain’s debt compared to its pre-war level. Because 
of the new debt, the British government had to maximize its income. Soon, it looked to the 
American colonists for extra revenue to service the debt incurred, in many politicians’ minds, 
on behalf of the American colonies. As nearly every student in school in the United States is 
taught, the United States was formed in response to these and many more grievances towards 
the British government.  
 This thesis does not recount the Seven Years’ War in detail.
2
 Rather, it discusses what 
was different about the Seven Years’ War and why it imposed much higher costs than 
                                               
1 Walter R. Borneman, The French and Indian War: Deciding the Fate of North America (New York: 
HarperCollins Publishers, 2006), 20-26. 
2 For thorough examinations of the Seven Years’ War, see Fred Anderson, Crucible of War (New York: Alfred 
A. Knopf, 2000) and Borneman, The French and Indian War. For historical perspectives on the war’s effects on 
France, see Lee Kennett, The French Armies in the Seven Years’ War: A Study in Military Organization and 
Administration (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1967) and James C. Riley, The Seven Years’ 
War and the Old Regime in France: The Economic and Financial Toll (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1986). For an examination of the war on the continent of Europe, see Franz A. J. Szabo, The Seven Years’ War 
in Europe, 1756-1763 (London: Pearson-Longman, 2008). 
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previous wars. It examines both secondary and primary sources to develop a central 
argument that it was the addition of North America as the main focus for Britain’s strategy 
that was the main cause of the high levels of military spending. Furthermore, primary sources 
are used to explain what in particular Britain was spending its money on in North America. 
Therefore, the thesis contains three distinct chapters not including the introduction and 
conclusion. 
 The first chapter examines the overall impact of the war’s spending levels on the 
national debt of Britain. Essentially, the British people and government were concerned with 
the drastic increases in the national debt before the war, and the war only compounded those 
fears. Thus, the chapter focuses on theories that help explain how public finances fund a war 
of this caliber. More secondary research is included in this chapter, explaining the theories 
and issues in studying national debt in different periods of history. It concludes with a 
discussion of the methods and ploys used by the government to gather the funds needed to 
help pay for the debt (and of course the interest on that debt) before the American War of 
Independence.  
 The next chapter focuses upon the first major cost of the war and how that affected 
military spending in Britain. Naval transportation was clearly the most important aspect of 
the war in North America. Without it, the soldiers on the frontier could not possibly receive 
the goods they needed to prosecute a war. Using both primary and secondary sources, the 
chapter examines the overall costs involved in shipping and protecting those goods on the 
way to North America. Once the goods arrived in the colonies, another and much more 
difficult trip had to be taken to deliver the matérial to the armies on the frontier. Being a 
much undeveloped region, the interior of North America was extremely difficult to navigate. 
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Therefore, many new roads and trails had to be built before the goods could reach their 
destination. Furthermore, it was necessary to appease Native American tribes before 
movements through various tribal lands could be attempted. Thus, the chapter examines the 
different costs associated with transporting goods to North America. 
 The final chapter examines the economic impact – both the explicit and implicit costs 
– of dealing with the Native American tribes that dominated the frontier. As armies travelled 
through the frontier, the British frequently, if not always, appealed to Indian tribes for 
assistance. Each tribe could change allegiances or provide warriors and scouts to both sides 
in the same campaign. Thus, it was necessary for the British as well as the French to provide 
economic incentives in the form of ―gifts‖ and guns in order to garner military support. In 
some cases, Europeans gave gifts to a particular tribe just to insure its neutrality in a coming 
battle or campaign. As seen quite often throughout the war, tribes that supported one side for 
most of the war (the Cherokee tribe is one example) would switch sides or rebel on their 
own. So, constant supplies of gifts and money were necessary to keep the Native Americans 
content. Additionally, the frontier Indians, as well as the frontier itself, forced the British 
army to change its tactics. As smaller units became necessary for quicker and more efficient 
travel through the frontier, more officers were needed to lead these small contingents, and 
officers had significantly higher salaries than enlisted men. Therefore, the frontier, Native 
Americans and tactical changes increased military spending to levels never seen before on 
the North American continent.  
There are several primary sources available for the discussion of this topic. General 
Jeffrey Amherst’s collection of papers from his time spent as commander of British forces in 
North America during the war is an essential source. Among other things, the Amherst 
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papers provide financial figures exemplifying the high cost of prosecuting war on the 
frontier.
3
 Along with the Amherst collection, Colonel Henry Bouquet’s personal papers also 
provide valuable evidence for the argument. These two collections of papers allow for a 
greater examination of the difficulties of making war on the frontier at the micro-level. Such 
evidence facilitates an appreciation of the overall effect that frontier warfare had upon the 
British Empire, specifically the national debt.  
Other primary sources reveal much about the tactical changes the British army made 
to succeed on the frontier. William Rogers’ journal from his time spent on the frontier 
provides the major source of information regarding new styles of warfare. He was assigned 
to create a unit of soldiers that were to be, in effect, an early form of special forces. Rogers 
was to train the men in a hybrid of Native American and British warfare. Also, Stanley 
Pargellis compiled a collection of documents, mainly military in nature, from the Duke of 
Cumberland’s collection of resources he kept in his possession from his time spent as an 
officer in the military and adviser to the Crown. These documents from the Seven Years’ 
War provide evidence to examine and explain the military’s view of the resources needed to 
pursue Britain’s goals and agendas effectively.  
 The primary sources are the major sources of information, but secondary sources are 
in abundance and cannot be ignored. As stated before, the Seven Years’ War has been 
heavily studied and researched. Yet, the military cost of the war has rarely been addressed. 
This thesis investigates the economic factors that caused military powers, such as England, to 
experience substantial increases in military spending during a war that saw fewer pitched 
                                               
3 Edith Mays ed., Amherst Papers, 1756-1763: The Southern Sector: Dispatches from South Carolina, Virginia 
and His Majesty’s Superintendant of Indian Affairs (Bowie, Maryland: Heritage Books, Inc. 1999). 
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battles and smaller numbers of soldiers involved than other wars. In effect, the work remains 
a military study at the micro-level.  
 One of the most important approaches to military history was formulated by Niall 
Ferguson in The Cash Nexus. Ferguson argues that money has always been the determining 
factor in warfare throughout history. He explains that governments’ military ambitions and 
needs always outweigh the finances that governments have in their treasuries. Ferguson 
contends, ―the history of finance is largely the history of attempts to close that gap.‖
4
 In 
Ferguson’s mind, finance directly affects the outcome of wars and battles, but those same 
wars and battles directly affect the financial market and the development of credit. In 
essence, more money usually equals more military victories. But Ferguson focuses on the 
20th century, and few historians have applied his arguments and theories to 18
th
 century 
warfare. 
 Newer research like Ferguson’s suggests that military spending has a larger influence 
on public debt than any other factor. Until recently, many historians used narratives and 
political causality to explain wars and battles, mentioning very little of the impact that 
financial resources have on militaries across the globe. Fortunately, recent research has shed 
some light on the subject as it is sorely needed. In Castles, Battles and Bombs, Jurgen Brauer 
and Hubert Van Tuyll take the argument further by suggesting that economic resources and 
power always determine how militaries operate and affects the outcomes of wars and 
conflicts. Brauer and Tuyll argue that economic principles can and must be applied in order 
to fully understand the complex nature of military history.
5
  
                                               
4 Niall Ferguson, The Cash Nexus: Money and Power in the Modern World, 1700-2000 (New York: Basic 
Books, 2001), 23. 
5 Jurgen Brauer and Hubert Van Tuyll, Castles, Battles and Bombs: How Economics Explains Military History 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2008), 6. 
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Interestingly, many were influenced by John Brewer’s The Sinews of Power, in which 
he examines Britain’s governmental structure and the rise of the fiscal-military state. He 
argues that the British government during the 18
th
 century was not the weak, decentralized 
version so often championed by historians. Instead, the British government dramatically 
increased in size and power. Supporting its growth were the taxation and economic policies 
capable of providing high levels of military spending. Furthermore, the state enacted radical 
increases in taxation and developed an efficient public debt system. As a result, the fiscal-
military state became the largest factor in the British economy.
6
  This thesis locates itself 
within this theoretical framework that Brauer, Tuyll, Ferguson and many others have 
formulated.
7
  
 There is a large amount of scholarly work on the Seven Years’ War written from 
several different perspectives. In 1884, Francis Parkman wrote an account of the war entitled 
Montcalm and Wolfe. This romanticized the Battle of Quebec as the climax of the war and 
glorified Wolfe’s role in the victory.
8
 Yet, the war was much more than just the Battle of 
Quebec. In fact, historians across the 20
th
 and early 21
st
 century have attempted to counter 
Parkman’s portrayal. Fred Anderson is one such writer. He has challenged the traditional 
view that the war should be regarded as primarily a conflict between France and England. 
This suggests that the war was neither won nor ended with the Battle of Quebec. 
Fred Anderson has written several works on the Seven Years’ War and its effects on 
the North American continent. His work, The Crucible of War, is perhaps the most complete 
and critically respected book on the war to date. He argues that the war led to the 
                                               
6 John Brewer, The Sinews of Power: War, Money and the English State, 1688-1783 (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1988). 
7 For more information regarding current military spending theory see: Jari Eloranta, Military Spending. EH-
Net. www.eh-net.org. 
8 Francis Parkman, Montcalm and Wolfe (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1897). 
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independence of the thirteen colonies but did not necessarily make the American Revolution 
inevitable. Anderson contends that American colonists’ bitter hatred for the Native 
Americans increased following the war, and that Britain’s efforts to stop westward expansion 
to keep settlers and Indians separate further enraged the colonists. But Anderson argues that, 
initially, the American Independence movement was only an attempt to change the imperial 
relationship between the colonies that Britain weakened following the end of the Seven 
Years’ War. American colonists did not imagine that following the end of the Seven Years’ 
War they would fight the very same king that had helped them to defeat the French on the 
North American continent.
9
  
 Anderson continues that the war is the single most important event in the 18
th
 century 
for the entire North American continent. Although the Seven Years’ War is more important 
than the American Revolution to the rest of the world, it has been treated with a type of mild 
neglect as a precursor to the American Revolution, yet Anderson attempts to dispel that 
myth. Although it is a significant event in American history, it is much more significant to 
the history of Europe and the Atlantic world in general. Rather than the Seven Years’ War 
being a backdrop for the American Revolution, he contends that the American Revolution is 
a direct consequence of the defeat of France. He makes it clear that American colonists and 
British ministers alike did not foresee the coming of the Revolution. Thus, during the Seven 
Years’ War, the British Americans held a strong belief that England was home and that the 
enemies were France and its Indian allies. Following the war, Americans no longer had to 
contend with French intrusions, just those of the Native Americans. As a result, Britain 
alienated its own people by eliminating the common enemy, France, which had held the two 
                                               
9Anderson, The Crucible of War, xx-xxi. Also found in Fred Anderson, The War That Made America (New 
York: Viking, 2005). 
9 
 
 
 
in close companionship. Anderson’s work has been influential, but there is a serious 
shortcoming in that he limits the effects that economics had upon the rise to Revolution. 
 Anderson’s perception of the relationship between the Seven Years’ War and the 
American Revolution is unique, but his argument that the Seven Years’ War had at least 
some effect on the American Revolution is far from unique. Many scholars have argued that 
the Seven Years’ War and the American Revolution cannot be separated when discussing 
reasons for the colonies’ uprising. J.R. Pole, Harrison Bird, A.G. Bradley and Herbert 
Osgood have all remarked upon the direct relationship between the two wars. Though they 
differ in detail, all argue that without the Seven Years’ War, there would be no American 
Independence. They all point to the results of the war, especially the British attempts to stem 
westward expansion and recoup their financial losses, as the driving force behind the 
American disillusionment with British policies.
10
 
 A different perspective is that of Howard Peckham. In his work on the wars on the 
North American continent during the colonial period, he contends that American military 
history began with the raising of militias to protect colonists from Native Americans and 
from French intrusion (the French raised militias and formed alliances with the Indians with 
the same objective). Peckham argues that the American colonists, through the experiences of 
the colonial wars, developed military ideals quite different from those of their European 
counterparts. The North American continent was relatively unaffected, barring a few naval 
engagements, by the Thirty Years’ War (1618-1648) and the methods of warfare that were 
established in Europe. Colonists dealt solely with the Native Americans until King William’s 
                                               
10 J.R. Pole, Foundations of American Independence, 1763-1815 (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company 
Inc., 1972); Harrison Bird, Battle for a Continent (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965); A.G. Bradley, 
The Fight with France for North America (New York: Arno Press and The New York Times, 1971) and Herbert 
Osgood, The American Colonies in the Eighteenth Century, Volumes 1-4 (Gloucester, Massachusetts: Peter 
Smith, 1958). 
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War, which began in 1689. In that war, Europeans, along with their Indian allies, waged war 
on each other as dictated by the politics of the European continent. North America now 
became a battlefront in the wars for empire. During these wars, the colonists developed an 
independent style of fighting using militia instead of regular soldiers. They were much more 
willing than their European counterparts to adapt their tactics to the frontier and the enemy 
and less likely to sit through a siege and winter encampments. Consequently, the American 
colonists developed a new political philosophy dependent upon the militia men who would 
defend their homes rather than practice war as a career since the frontier offered more 
opportunity than military life.  
 Peckham sees the post-1689 period as one of escalation and seemingly useless 
fighting, culminating in the Seven Years’ War that ended the contest between the French and 
British for ascendancy in North America. From King William’s War with barely 2,000 men 
in arms on both sides to the British government’s raising of 25,000 men for regular service in 
the Seven Years’ War, he shows that each successive war marked an escalation in both size 
and severity. War in North America tended to be on a more modest scale, but it was much 
more brutal and savage. There was no guarantee that if a soldier surrendered honorably he 
would live to see a prison, much less home. American militias were therefore averse to 
regular service for very good reasons. However, the Seven Years’ War drastically increased 
the numbers of men and supplies needed for the frontier war.
11
  
 Walter R. Borneman emphasizes that the Seven Years’ War resulted in Britain’s 
destruction of the French empire in North America. This eased the anxiety previously 
associated with the possibility of French attack on the frontier. Now American colonists had 
                                               
11 Howard H. Peckham, The Colonial Wars, 1689-1762 (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1964), 120-
38.  
11 
 
 
 
only the Native Americans to be concerned about, and the war had drastically reduced the 
ferocity and frequency of Indian attacks. Therefore, when Britain placed heavier taxes on 
American colonists and created buffer zones to stop westward expansion, the colonies 
revolted against the Crown because, in the colonists’ eyes, there was no more need for 
Britain’s arbitrary boundaries.
12
 
 An understanding of Britain’s military costs during the Seven Years’ War is also 
facilitated by the work of Douglas Edward Leach. In Roots of Conflict, he explores the 
motivations, events and problems that created a divide between the colonists and British 
regular forces sent to fight in North America. Leach argues that the period from 1677-1763 
saw a developing rift between colonial militia and governments on one side and, on the other, 
the British army and naval forces that were needed to protect the border with France and the 
Native Americans. He gives examples of cooperation and confrontations between the 
colonists and regular British forces.
13
 What is clear is that the conflict between British forces 
and American colonists continued to develop as the colonial period progressed. But one 
notable gap in Leach’s analysis is that he ignores the economic issues that had a bearing on 
the Seven Years’ War. 
 More importance is given to economic issues in Richard Middleton’s work, The Bells 
of Victory, which attempts to retell the story of William Pitt and his role in the ministry that 
controlled the British government during its most successful war up until that point in British 
history. Historians before Middleton, and a few since, have given Pitt the credit for the 
successful operation of the Seven Years’ War. However, Middleton argues that Pitt was not 
the only figure that was responsible for Britain’s success. Instead, he contends that Pitt was 
                                               
12 Borneman, The French and Indian War, xxii-xxiii.  
13 Douglas Edward Leach, Roots of Conflict: British Armed Forces and Colonial Americans, 1677-1763 
(Chapel Hill and London: The University of North Carolina Press, 1986). 
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just one of a group of talented men who were able to successfully coalesce into an effective 
government. Together, they won the Seven Years’ War and gained for Britain control over 
the Atlantic Ocean and North America.
14
  
 Middleton does not rate Pitt as highly as some other historians do, and argues that Pitt 
had little to offer his office of Secretary of State for the Southern Department, noting that 
―style and rhetoric were not the only qualities admired and some commentators were inclined 
to be critical of Pitt’s excessive attention to form.‖
15
 Pitt was not an incredibly intelligent and 
talented individual who could control the government single-handedly. Instead, he excelled 
at speeches and political discussion, able to convince those in power that his agendas were 
practical. Pitt only had a short career as a soldier and did not study law or financial issues. 
Pitt’s aggressive attitude towards funding the Seven Years’ War was based on little actual 
knowledge of how public finance worked. Thus, a high national debt was an expected 
consequence. Clearly, Middleton focuses on the political significance of the financial issues 
faced by the Pitt-Newcastle Ministry rather than on the economic issues themselves.  
 There is one historian who examines the economic aspects of the war – specifically 
the war at sea. David Syrett, in Shipping and Military Power in the Seven Years’ War: The 
Sails of Victory, argues that the ability to supply goods and men to different areas of the 
globe was the best advantage Britain had over any other power of the period. The book 
supplies valuable information on the functioning of the British Navy to supply the massive 
undertaking to defeat France during the Seven Years’ War. Syrett argues that Britain’s 
shipping system was the primary reason for its ability to neutralize France’s navy and that it 
helped the British to defeat French armies around the world. He shows that the Navy Board, 
                                               
14 Richard Middleton, The Bells of Victory: The Pitt-Newcastle Ministry and the Conduct of the Seven Years’ 
War, 1757-1762 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985). 
15 Ibid., 7. 
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or the Commissioners of the Navy, and the clerical and logistical heads of the Royal Navy, 
consistently chartered private ships for the purpose of providing the shipping needed for 
transporting troops, horses and other supplies required by the navy or army. They would use 
either long-term time charters or space charters. Space charters were used to provide shipping 
for a small distance, usually between ships out at sea. When large amounts of shipping were 
necessary, when a huge campaign was on or an extended siege occurred, time charters were 
used to pay freight to ships that stayed in service and carried goods and troops to where they 
needed to be. As is made clear by Syrett, the naval and military supplies necessary to conduct 
the war were expensive.
16
 His work provides the basis for the naval shipping section of this 
thesis in Chapter 2.  
 Most of the works published on the Seven Years’ War focus on the effects it had on 
the North American continent. Stephen Brumwell, author of Redcoats: The British Soldier 
and War in the Americas, 1755-1763, suggests that there is too much research on the Seven 
Years’ War from the American perspective. He asserts that the British army soldiers were of 
much better quality than current scholarship allows. He argues that the Seven Years’ War 
was a turning point for the British soldier. Brumwell discusses the effect that the war on the 
North American continent had on the regular British soldier.
17
 He explains how the frontier 
forced new types of soldiers to be trained and recruited. Although his ideas have certainly 
influenced the arguments made below in this thesis, he focuses on tactics, morale and 
performance rather than the economic difficulties that arose from the prosecution of warfare 
on the frontier. 
                                               
16 David Syrett, Shipping and Military Power in the Seven Years’ War: The Sails of Victory (Exeter: University 
of Exeter Press, 2008), 5-6. 
17 Stephen Brumwell, Redcoats: The British Soldier and War in the Americas, 1755-1763 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002). 
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 There are many possible explanations for the lack of European perspective on the 
Seven Years’ War in America. For one thing, most of the battles that took place on the 
American continent were fought by colonists and Indians. The main armies of Britain and 
France were relatively inactive on the North American continent. Naval battles did take place 
on an ever-increasing scale during the war, but naval conflicts were continuous throughout 
the 18
th
 century. There are several publications that examine the role of European powers 
during the Seven Years’ War, especially in the area of diplomacy. Jeremy Black is one 
historian who has examined the Seven Years’ War from the European perspective. His work, 
European International Relations, 1648-1815, is a close examination of the diplomatic 
relationships between European countries and especially the imperial powers. Black argues 
that Prussia became a European power following the Seven Years’ War because of its 
alliance with Britain.
18
 Karl Schweizer has also examined the alliance between Britain and 
Prussia that existed before and after the Seven Years’ War. He asserts that the alliance was 
essential to Prussia’s survival as a unified state.
19
 
 Even sociologists, like Jeremy Smith, have elucidated aspects of the Seven Years’ 
War. Smith argues that the war led to the establishment of new trade relationships. These 
were either enforced or occurred spontaneously during and after the war. He says, ―During 
this time commercial advantages became part of the spoils of war.‖
20
 Smith thinks that wars 
during the 18
th
 century were fought primarily to control trade routes and empires, and the 
Seven Years’ War was no exception. Smith argues that institutions, such as the military and 
                                               
18 Jeremy Black, European International Relations 1648-1875 (New York: Palgrave, 2002). 
19 Karl W. Schweizen, War, Politics and Diplomacy (Oxford: University Press of America Inc., 2001). 
20 Jeremy Smith, Europe and the Americas: State Formation, Capitalism and Civilizations in Atlantic 
Modernity (Boston: Brill, 2006), 234-35.  
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commercial entities, changed dramatically during the war in order to capitalize on the gains 
made by Britain and its allies. 
 In the majority of the published works on the Seven Years’ War, frontier warfare is 
overlooked. Only Stephen Brumwell’s Redcoats comes close to discussing the economic 
impact that the new style of warfare created during the war. To overlook this aspect of the 
war is to overlook the most essential piece of the puzzle that is military history. Today in the 
early 21
st
 century, it is important to understand the effects that military spending can have on 
a nation’s economy and power more fully, especially with respect to the modern wars fought 
in the Middle East. In order to properly assess the drastic effect that high military spending 
has had on the national budgets of nation-states, the reason for the high cost of operating the 
military at a given point in history must be studied. 
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I. PAYING THE PRICE: BRITAIN’S NATIONAL DEBT CRISIS 
 
"Osama (bin Laden) doesn't have to win; he will just bleed us to death.‖
21
 This 
statement comes from a former CIA counterterrorism agent, Michael Scheuer who led the 
initial search for bin Laden. He was talking about the substantial amount of money spent by 
the United States government in order to defeat jihadists in Afghanistan and Iraq. Scheuer’s 
point rings true for nearly every war that has ever been fought anywhere: Money is the main 
motor of war. As money is not always readily available to governments, national or public 
debt is accrued in order to prosecute wars. Scheuer was not concerned with actual bloodshed; 
he was concerned that the debt that had risen drastically higher immediately after the 
invasion of Afghanistan and that the Iraq conflict would cripple the American economy. He 
stated this in 2005 a mere two years after the invasion of Iraq. Five years later, American 
debt continues to rise amid foreign wars and a domestic economic downturn, but American 
credit has yet to disappear. A little over 250 years ago in Great Britain, Phillip Stanhope, 
friend of William Pitt the Elder, Secretary of State for the Southern Department under 
George II and de facto leader of the government for most of the Seven Years’ War, sent a 
letter to a friend that read: ―In my opinion, our greatest danger arises from our expense, 
considering the present immense National Debt.‖
22
 Similar to Scheuer on the U.S. situation, 
Stanhope recognized that Britain’s debt was already at a record high and that going to war 
                                               
21 As quoted in: James Sterngold, ―Casualty of War: The U.S. Economy‖, San Francisco Chronicle, 17 July 
2005. 
22 Letter from Lord Chesterfield to Solomon Dayrolles, printed in John Bradshaw, ed., The Letters of Philip 
Dormer Stanhope, Earl of Chesterfield (London: Swan Sonnerschein and Company, 1905), 1146. 
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with France would increase the debt burden like never before. His remark in 1756 quite 
plainly shows that citizens there was concern with national debt even before debt figures 
were readily available as they are in today’s information age.  
 It is these very issues with which this thesis is concerned, namely the implications of 
the cost of warfare and, in particular, the debt burden that may arise from conflicts. This 
chapter examines how Britain’s national debt rose dramatically during the Seven Years’ War 
and analyzes the implications of this growth. There are various reasons for the dramatic rise, 
but the major reason discussed below is military spending. The addition of the North 
American continent as a major theater of war created the need for higher public spending and 
it challenged the British government’s ability to shoulder the new burdens effectively. 
Additionally, this chapter investigates the impact that the military expenditures had upon the 
national debt and whether it created positive impacts or negative constraints for Britain’s 
economy and government. The British debt nearly doubled from the pre-war total as a result 
of the capital-intensive war in which she was engaged. Ultimately, the Seven Years’ War 
contributed to the American Revolution via the unexpected fiscal pressures on Great Britain 
produced by debt.  
There are numerous studies on 19
th
 and 20
th
 century military spending patterns, but 
few address the fiscal behavior of states prior to the French Revolution and the Napoleonic 
conflicts.
23
 The first part of this chapter provides broad comparative figures to illustrate the 
fiscal strain of wars on Britain as well as other states over centuries. By using Britain in the 
                                               
23 On 19th and 20th century military spending, see e.g. Jari Eloranta, ―From the Great Illusion to the Great War: 
Military Spending Behaviour of the Great Powers, 1870–1913,‖ European Review of Economic History II, 
August (2007); Ferguson, The Cash Nexus; Mark Harrison, ed., The Economics of World War II: Six Great 
Powers in International Comparisons (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998). On long-run 
comparisons in the early modern period, see esp. Richard Bonney, ed., The Rise of the Fiscal State in Europe C. 
1200-1815 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999). On public debt patterns, in addition to Ferguson see James 
Macdonald, A Free Nation Deep in Debt: The Financial Roots of Democracy (New York: Farrar, Straus and 
Giroux, 2003). 
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Seven Years’ War as a case study, this thesis can focus on a pivotal event that contributed, as 
it is often claimed, to the separation of the motherland from the thirteen American colonies.
24
 
It is not surprising to find that the majority of public spending (thus public debt burden) was 
directed to the military and navy. Therefore, it is necessary to examine the particular reasons 
for the higher military spending and address several key questions, such as: 1) Was the high 
cost due to the war being much broader in scope than before? Or is it the nature of the 
conflict as a multi-theater war? 2) Was military spending the primary cause of the increased 
indebtedness? 3) Was this increase more rapid than in other conflicts, thus forcing Britain to 
try to shift some of the burden to its colonies? If yes, why? Included is a discussion of the 
current and past research and theories that shed light on the public spending discussion 
amongst economists, historians and politicians.  
Following the discussion of recent research and British debt figures, the chapter 
shows that contemporaries were concerned with the debt and that many foresaw the 
difficulties in paying for the debt once the war was over. As seen in the data on the British 
state, Great Britain used most of their income during the war on the war itself. Following the 
war’s conclusion, however, British governments spent much more than the national income 
in servicing that war debt. There was a drastic increase in the amount of income devoted to 
public spending following rather than during the war.  
Finally, it is argued that Britain’s financial institutions and government were much 
more capable of enduring the capital-intensive war than were those of France or her allies. 
Effectively, Britain was able to, in a fashion, purchase an empire following its victory in the 
Seven Years’ War by merely spending more and negotiating lower interest rates on its debt 
                                               
24 See e.g. Niall Ferguson, Empire: The Rise and Demise of the British World Order and the Lessons for Global 
Power (New York: Basic Books, 2003). 
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than the enemy. However, the massive empire gained by Britain became a hollow empire, 
since the state’s debt obligations contained implicit promises of payback and a return on his 
investment for the buyer. Many prominent British citizens bought into the debt. Thus, the 
government attempted to equalize the burden of debt. However, it became difficult for 
Britain to consolidate its new gains, and just a decade later it faced a new dilemma. Britain, 
because of the larger debt incurred by the war, pressed the American colonies, the least taxed 
part of the Empire, to help pay it. This became a major reason, or at least a trigger 
mechanism, for the independence movement that created the United States of America.  
  
Research on Fiscal Aspects of Conflicts, Public Debt and the Seven Years’ War  
There are certain characteristics that can be discerned in the efforts to study 20
th
 
century conflicts and spending patterns in the fields of history, economics and political 
science. Often the focus has been on the largest conflicts in human history as well as long-
run development patterns, which would enable understanding of broad patterns and 
theories.
25
 Many historians, economic historians in particular, have recently focused on the 
big conflicts, especially the world wars. Examples of recent work combining the theoretical 
aspects of economics with historical case studies are The Economics of World War II, edited 
by Mark Harrison, and its prequel on World War I.
26
 Unfortunately, the focus of many of 
these studies has been on the 20
th
 century, especially among economists and political-conflict 
                                               
25 See Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers. Economic Change and Military Conflict from 
1500 to 2000 (London: Fontana, 1989). Other examples of long-run explanations can be found in Maurice 
Pearton, The Knowledgeable State: Diplomacy, War, and Technology since 1830 (London: Burnett Books, 
1982). Studies of similar scope include Jeremy Black, European Warfare, 1660-1815 (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1994); Jeremy Black, ―War and the World, 1450-2000,‖ The Journal of Military History 63, 
no. 3 (1999), Jeremy Black, ―Britain as a Military Power, 1688-1815,‖ Journal of Military History 64 no. 1 
(2000); Jeremy Black, Western Warfare, 1775-1882 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001), Jeremy 
Black, Introduction to Global Military History: 1775 to the Present Day (London: Routledge, 2005). 
26 See Harrison, ed., The Economics of World War II See also Stephen Broadberry and Mark Harrison, eds., The 
Economics of World War I (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).  
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scientists. Moreover, even though some cycle theorists and conflict scientists have been 
interested in the formation of modern nation states and the respective system of states since 
1648, they have not expressed any real interest in long-run analysis of the causes of warfare, 
or in smaller wars that may have had big consequences for world history.
27
 
 Another, more specified area of interest for scholars has been economic warfare, 
which takes a multitude of forms, from fairly benign policy measures and sanctions to 
outright warfare in the context of total war.
28
 Lance Davis and Stanley Engerman, for 
example, have studied naval blockades covering several centuries. Their approach is to study 
a multitude of conflicts and make informed comparisons about the impact of blockades. As 
they point out, the success of a blockade is often difficult to assess.
29
 There is also a 
resurgence of scholarship focused on pre-20
th
 century conflicts, especially the French 
Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars. David Bell, in his recent influential monograph, puts the 
Revolutionary wars and the ensuing Napoleonic conflicts into the same category as the world 
wars.
30
 Similarly, Kevin O’Rourke has provided innovative insights into the Revolutionary 
and Napoleonic era by focusing on the contraction of trade.
31
  
                                               
27 See Todd Sandler and Keith Hartley, The Economics of Defense, ed. Mark Perlman, Cambridge Surveys of 
Economic Literature (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995) for a good overview of the defense 
economics literature. Respectively, on conflict studies, see Edward D. Mansfield and Brian M. Pollins, ―The 
Study of Interdependence and Conflict: Recent Advances, Open Questions, and Directions for Future 
Research,‖ The Journal of Conflict Resolution 45, no. 6 (2001). A classic study of war from the holistic 
perspective is Quincy Wright, A Study of War (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1942). 
28 See e.g. Alan S. Milward, ―Economic Warfare in Perspective,‖ in East-West Trade and the Cold War, ed. Jari 
Eloranta and Jari Ojala (Jyvaskyla: University of Jyvaskyla, 2005); R. Thomas Naylor, Economic Warfare: 
Sanctions, Embargo Busting, and Their Human Cost (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 2001). On the 
variety of methods for engaging in economic warfare, see T. E. Førland, ―The History of Economic Warfare: 
International Law, Effectiveness, Strategies,‖ Journal of Peace Research  (1993); James P. O'Leary, ―Economic 
Warfare and Strategic Economics,‖ Comparative Strategy 5, no. 2 (1985). 
29 Lance E. Davis and Stanley L. Engerman, Naval Blockades in Peace and War: An Economic History since 
1750 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006). See also F. Crouzet, ―Wars, Blockade, and Economic 
Change in Europe, 1792-1815,‖ Journal of Economic History  (1964). 
30 David Bell, The First Total War: Napoleon's Europe and the Birth of Warfare as We Know It (New York: 
Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2007). 
31 Kevin O'Rourke, ―The Worldwide Economic Impact of the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, 
1793-1815,‖ Journal of Global History 1, no. 1 (2006).  
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It is a common argument in the literature that economic development and military 
spending are closely interdependent, with military spending being the driving force behind 
economic cycles. However, as recent studies have shown, economic development is often 
more significant in explaining military spending rather than vice versa. As some of the 
hegemonic theorists argue, economic prosperity might be a necessary prerequisite for war 
and expansion. Therefore, economic growth would induce rising government expenditures, 
which in turn would enable higher military spending.
32
 In order for military spending to 
hinder economic performance, it would have to surpass all other areas of an economy, as is 
often the case during wartime. However, the long-run fiscal consequences of conflict and 
excessive military spending can be substantial, depending on the way that those expenditures 
were financed. In particular, if most of the funding was made possible by increasing public 
debt levels, those consequences can be far-reaching indeed. 
Public debt analysis can be just as interdisciplinary as the investigation of conflicts 
and their economic consequences. Among economists, the main thrust of the scholarship has 
been to try to model the impact of debts and deficits vis-à-vis economic growth. Robert 
Barro’s groundbreaking studies on the determinants of public debt and especially the so-
called tax-smoothing hypothesis, implying that budget deficits can be used to smooth tax 
rates over time, are good examples of such scholarship, and Barro also has tested his models 
                                               
32 Brian M.  Pollins and Randall L. Schweller, ―Linking the Levels: The Long Wave and Shifts in U.S. Foreign 
Policy, 1790- 1993,‖ American Journal of Political Science 43, no. 2 (1999) e.g. 445-446. Moreover, Alex 
Mintz and Chi Huang, ―Guns Versus Butter: The Indirect Link,‖ American Journal of Political Science 35, no. 
1 (1991)  suggest an indirect (negative) growth effect via investment at a lag of at least five years. Interestingly, 
this same issue is seen in the historiography of Britain after 1945. The debate on economic performance as 
compared to military spending can be found in: Malcolm Chalmers, Paying for Defence: Military Spending and 
British Decline (London: Pluto Press, 1985) and Jeffrey Pickering, Britain's Withdrawal From East of Suez: 
The Politics of Retrenchment (New York: Palgrave Macmillan,1998). 
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empirically, mostly by using 20
th
 century U.S. data.
33
 Using long-run British data, from he 
1700s to 1918, he found that temporary military spending was the major determinant of 
budget deficits, and that British results indicate a one-to-one response of budget deficits to 
temporary spending.
34
 Typically, however, economists have not been interested in public 
debt patterns or the impact of deficits in the long run, or at least by using historical data 
beyond the 20
th
 century. These studies have been focused either on the impact of the world 
wars or on the post-war period.
35
 While it is true that the Great War in particular contributed 
to higher levels of public debt in its aftermath, given that many countries resisted the idea of 
funding the conflict through increased taxation, the levels of indebtedness among the 
industrialized nations during the 20
th
 century were not necessarily very high historically (see 
Figure 1).
36
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
33 Robert J. Barro, ―The Ricardian Approach to Budget Deficits,‖ The Journal of Economic Perspectives 3, no. 
2 (1989), Robert J. Barro, ―U.S. Deficits since World War I,‖ The Scandinavian Journal of Economics 88, no. 1 
(1986), Robert J. Barro, ―On the Determination of the Public Debt,‖ The Journal of Political Economy 87, no. 
5, Part 1 (1979). 
34 Robert J. Barro, ―Government Spending, Interest Rates, Prices, and Budget Deficits in the United Kingdom, 
1701-1918,‖Journal of monetary economics 20, no. September (1987). 
35 See Gail E. Makinen and G. Thomas Woodward, ―Funding Crises in the Aftermath of World War I,‖ in 
Public Debt Management: Theory and History, ed. Rudiger Dornbusch and Mario Draghi (Cambridge England; 
New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990). 
36 See especially Stephen Broadberry and Mark Harrison, ―The Economics of World War I: An Overview,‖ in 
The Economics of World War I.. 
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Figure 1. Ratio of Central Government Debt to GDP (%), 1870-1990 
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Sources: Derek Hung Chiat Chen, Intertemporal Excess Burden, Bequest Motives, and the 
Budget Deficit (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2003); Ferguson, The Cash Nexus; B. R. 
Mitchell, British Historical Statistics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988); B. R. 
Mitchell International Historical Statistics: Europe 1750-1993, 4th ed. (Basingstoke: 
Macmillan Academic and Professional, 1998); B. R. Mitchell International Historical 
Statistics: The Americas 1750-1993, 4th ed. (London: Macmillan, 1998); Maurice Obstfeld, 
and A. M. Taylor, "Sovereign Risk, Credibility and the Gold Standard: 1870-1913 Versus 
1925-31," The Economic Journal 113, (April 2003): 241-75; United Nations Department of 
Economic Affairs Fiscal Division, Public Debt, 1914-1946 (Lake Success, N.Y., 1948); 
United States Bureau of the Public Debt, The Public Debt Online (Washington, D.C.: United 
States Bureau of the Public Debt, 2000). 
 
There has also been a lot of interesting scholarship on public debt patterns.
37
 The 
most comprehensive accounts of long-term public debt burdens and deficits can be found in 
James MacDonald’s A Free Nation Deep in Debt. The Financial Roots of Democracy and in 
Niall Ferguson’s The Cash Nexus: Money and Power in the Modern World, 1700-2000. 
These books offer broad overviews of the evolution of the practice of public debt and levels 
                                               
37 See especially Bonney, ed., The Rise of the Fiscal State in Europe Circa 1200-1815 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1999); Barry J. Eichengreen and Peter H. Lindert, The International Debt Crisis in Historical 
Perspective (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1989); John Maloney, Debt and Deficits: An Historical Perspective 
(Northampton, Mass.: Edward Elgar, 1998). 
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of debt over centuries. As both point out, the development of practices with which 
representative governments were able to borrow money domestically (via government bonds) 
was a crucial element in the fiscal rise of powerful states like the Netherlands and Great 
Britain. Their governments were able to borrow more cheaply because there were constraints 
on what the sovereigns could do with the money, or at least how they could use taxes to 
finance the repayment. Thus the middle classes in these countries were linked symbiotically 
to their emerging quasi-democratic governments. In England, this was a notable development 
after the Glorious Revolution of 1688.
38
 
In the 16
th
 century, monarchies started to utilize various forms of public debts more 
widely, for example in the form of rentes in France. Yet, it was the birth of the consol in 
Britain that marked the beginning of the history of modern public debt. Consols were 
redeemable at par but otherwise perpetual, enabling the government to raise large amounts of 
capital in a crisis situation. Ultimately, a nation also had to introduce other institutional and 
organizational innovations, such as stock markets and central banks, to be able to tap into its 
financial resources more effectively. This Dutch/British model became the cornerstone for 
the emerging fiscal states, and the British system of public debt was emulated throughout the 
Western world in the 19
th
 century.
39
  
  
 
 
                                               
38 Ferguson, The Cash Nexus; Macdonald, A Free Nation Deep in Debt; Douglass C. North, Institutions, 
Institutional Change, and Economic Performance (Cambridge; N.Y.: Cambridge University Press, 1990); D. C. 
North and B. R. Weingast, ―Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutional Governing Public 
Choice in Seventeenth-Century England,‖ The Journal of Economic History 49, no. 4 (1989). On the discussion 
of why it is better to borrow domestically, see also the classic article by James M. Buchanan, ―External and 
Internal Public Debt,‖ The American Economic Review 47, no. 6 (1957). 
39 Ferguson, The Cash Nexus, 23-30. 
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Figure 2. English Real Tax Revenue, 1290-1815 
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Source: European State Finance Database (ESFD), Patrick O’Brien, England 
http://www.le.ac.uk/hi/bon/ESFDB/OBRIEN/obrien.html, Accessed 22 Feb 2010.  
 
Richard Bonney addresses this problem in his writings on mainly the early modern 
states. He emphasizes that their revenue and tax collection systems, the backbone of any 
militarily successful nation-state, have followed a specific evolutionary trajectory over 
time.
40
 For example, in most European states the government became the arbiter of disputes 
and the defender of certain basic rights in the society by the early modern period. During the 
Middle Ages, the European fiscal systems were relatively backward and autarchic, with 
mostly predatory rulers (or roving bandits, as Mancur Olson has coined them).
41
 According 
to Bonney, the next stage was the so-called tribute state, then the domain state (with 
stationary bandits, providing some public goods), the tax state (more reliance on credit and 
revenue collection) and finally the fiscal state (embodying more complex fiscal and political 
                                               
40 He outlines most of the following in the introduction of his edited volume The Rise of the Fiscal State in 
Europe C. 1200-1815. 
41 Mancur Olson, ―Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development,‖ American Political Science Review 87, no. 3 
(1993). 
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structures). A superpower like Great Britain in the 19
th
 century had to be a fiscal state in 
order to dominate the world, due to all the burdens that went with an empire. With that fiscal 
state came an efficient system of taxation, a more democratic form of government, and 
reliance on public debt during times of crises.
42
 
The English fiscal state came about slowly. In fact, the English crown could only 
raise short-term debt in the mid-16
th
 century. And by the mid-17
th
 century, the English 
monarchs had almost no creditworthiness left. Moreover, the Glorious Revolution was not a 
quick fix; it took until after 1720 for a stable form of parliamentary government to be 
established, and thus exercise any sort of control over the fiscal affairs of the monarchy.
43
 It 
seems that England’s fiscal affairs stabilized earlier, though, as seen in Figure 2. The real tax 
revenues started increasing steadily from the late 15
th
 century onwards, creating at least some 
constancy for the crown’s finances. Of course, given the massive appetite of early modern 
sovereigns for warfare – resulting in the highest total of years that at least one of the great 
powers was in a conflict in the 16
th
 century, compared to the other centuries during the last 
500 years – it was not enough.
44
 
 As Niall Ferguson has pointed out, military expenditures were the primary budget 
item for nation states prior to the 20
th
 century, and the principal cause of fiscal innovation 
throughout most of history.
45
 It is possible that military expenditures have also had long-term 
consequences for government budgets, which is an idea known as the ―Peacock-Wiseman 
displacement hypothesis.‖ Peacock and Wiseman divided the explanatory forces of 
                                               
42 On the British Empire, see especially Ferguson, Empire: The Rise and Demise of the British World Order and 
the Lessons for Global Power. Ferguson has also tackled the issue of a possible American empire in the more 
polemical Niall Ferguson, Colossus: The Price of America's Empire (New York: Penguin Press, 2004). 
43 Macdonald, A Free Nation Deep in Debt, 161-68. 
44 Ferguson, The Cash Nexus; Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1990 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Basil Blackwell, 1990). 
45 See especially Ferguson, The Cash Nexus. See also Jari Eloranta, ―National Defense,‖ in The Oxford 
Encyclopedia of Economic History, ed. Joel Mokyr (Oxford: The Oxford University Press, 2003). 
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government spending into two groups: 1) permanent influences on government expenditures 
(income, population growth, prices, level of employment and the ―political nature of the 
society concerned‖; 2) displacement effects and the concentration process, such as the idea 
that wars (and other large economic shocks) may have been the driving force behind changes 
in government spending patterns. They contend that governments are forced to respond to the 
challenges posed by such events, especially the commitments arising from debt 
commitments, war pensions and other similar issues. At the same time, increased wartime 
taxation would induce a change in the public’s tolerance for taxation.
46
 These changes can 
bring forth a permanent change or merely a temporary upswing in the government spending 
levels. As Karen Rasler and William Thompson have maintained, it may be that only global 
wars (or other global economic shocks) have this effect on government spending. There is 
evidence to support this notion in connection with the Napoleonic wars and the two world 
wars.
47
 However, what has not been studied is whether smaller conflicts had similar impacts 
on spending and, ultimately, taxation and public debt patterns. 
Therefore it is necessary to study a smaller conflict, one that has not been studied 
enough, but focusing in this case on a war that had far-reaching consequences. As Niall 
Ferguson and others have claimed, the Seven Years’ War contributed to the separation of the 
motherland from the thirteen American colonies. Great Britain attempted to shift part of the 
financial burden of this expensive conflict onto the thirteen colonies which were the least 
                                               
46 Alan T. Peacock and Jack Wiseman, The Growth of Public Expenditures in the United Kingdom (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1961), 21-31; Peter H. Lindert, ―The Rise of Social Spending, 1880-1930,‖ 
Explorations in Economic History 31, no. 1 (1994); Peter H. Lindert, ―What Limits Social Spending?,‖ 
Explorations in Economic History 33, no. 1 (1996); Caroly Webber and Aaron Wildavsky, A History of 
Taxation and Expenditure in the Western World (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986). 
47 Karen A. Rasler and William R. Thompson, War and State Making. The Shaping of the Global Powers, vol. 
2, Studies in International Conflict (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989), 106-109, 121; Karen Rasler and William R. 
Thompson, ―Technological Innovation, Capability Positional Shifts, and Systemic War,‖ Journal of Conflict 
Resolution 35, no. 3 (1991). 
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taxed part of the empire.
48
 What is known currently about this conflict, which turned into a 
truly global war with multiple theaters?  
 
Military Spending and the British Public Debt 
 
England made substantial investments in its military forces, especially the navy, in 
the 16
th
 century. The technological innovations introduced during Henry VIII’s reign, such as 
heavier cannons and gunports, certainly increased England’s fighting capacity. England 
epitomizes the transition toward a more permanent, commercialized military management 
system. In the period 1535-1547, the English defense share (military expenditures as a 
percentage of central government expenditures) averaged 29.4 percent, with large 
fluctuations from year to year. However, in the period 1685-1813, the mean English defense 
share was 74.6 percent, never dropping below 55 percent.
49
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
48 See Ferguson, Empire. 
49 Eloranta, ―National Defense.‖ 
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Figure 3. English Defense Share in Comparison with the Low Countries in the Early 
Modern Period 
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Sources: Calculated from the various sources in European State Finance Database (ESFD), 
P. O’Brien, England, (http://www.le.ac.uk/hi/bon/ESFDB/OBRIEN/obrien.html); L. van der 
Ent, W. Fritschy, E. Horlings and R. Liesker, Low Countries 
(http://www.le.ac.uk/hi/bon/ESFDB/NETH/neth.htm), Accessed 20 Feb 2010. 
 
How does this compare to other nations? As seen in Figures 3 and 4, the English defense 
share was substantially higher than that of the Low Countries in this period, especially during 
the 18
th
 century, and higher even than the defense shares of Austria, Denmark and Russia, all 
of which had substantial involvement in the great power wars of the 18
th
 century.  
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Figure 4. English Defense Share in Comparison with Denmark, Austria and Russia in 
the Early Modern Period 
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Sources: Calculated from the various sources in European State Finance Database (ESFD), 
P. O’Brien, England, (http://www.le.ac.uk/hi/bon/ESFDB/OBRIEN/obrien.html); B. 
Poulsen, Denmark,( http://www.le.ac.uk/hi/bon/ESFDB/POUL/poul.html); Austria, 
(http://www.le.ac.uk/hi/bon/ESFDB/AUSTRIA/austria.html); R. Bonney, Russia 
(http://www.le.ac.uk/hi/bon/ESFDB/RUSSIA/russia.html), Accessed 20 Feb, 2010. 
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Table 1. English, French and Prussian Defense Shares in the 17
th
 and 18
th
 Centuries 
England France Prussia 
Year(s) Defense 
Share 
Year(s) Defense 
Share 
Year(s) Defense 
Share 
1690 82 1620-1629 40 .. - 
1700 66 1630-1639 35 .. - 
1710 88 1640-1649 33 .. - 
1720 68 1650-1659 21 1711-1720 78 
1730 63 1660-1669 42 1721-1730 75 
1741 77 1670-1679 65 1731-1740 82 
1752 62 1680-1689 52 1741-1750 88 
1760 88 1690-1699 76 1751-1760 90 
1770 64 1726 35 1761-1770 91 
1780 89 1751 41 1771-1780 91 
1790 63 1775 30 1781-1790 78 
1800 85 1788 25 1791-1800 82 
Sources: Calculated from the various sources in European State Finance Database (ESFD), 
P. O’Brien, England (http://www.le.ac.uk/hi/bon/ESFDB/OBRIEN/obrien.html); M. Körner, 
France and Prussia (http://www.le.ac.uk/hi/bon/ESFDB/KORNER/korner.html), Accessed 
20 Feb 2010. 
 
As Table 1 indicates, France allocated a substantially lower share of its budget to military 
spending, and only Prussia really compares to the English military spending effort. Whereas 
Prussia’s defense share was continuously high, the English defense share went up and down, 
influenced by the various conflicts during this period. 
In addition, the cost and scale of warfare increased rapidly in the early modern period. 
For example, during the Thirty Years’ War between 100,000 and 200,000 men fought under 
arms, whereas twenty years later 450,000 to 500,000 men fought on both sides in the War of 
the Spanish Succession.
50
 With the increasing scale of armed conflicts in the 17
th
 century, the 
participants became more and more dependent on access to long-term credit, because 
whichever government ran out of money had to surrender first. For example, although the 
causes of Spain’s decline in the 17
th
 century are still disputed, it is clear that the lack of royal 
credit and the poor management of government finances resulted in heavy deficit spending as 
                                               
50 Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1990, 165; Henry Kamen, ―The Economic and Social 
Consequences of the Thirty Years' War,‖ Past and Present (April 1968). 
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military exertions followed one after another in the 17
th
 century. Therefore, the Spanish 
Crown defaulted repeatedly during the 16
th
 and 17
th
 centuries, and on several occasions this 
forced Spain to seek an end to its military activities.
51
  
A key question for France, as compared to England, was the financing of its military. 
According to Richard Bonney, the cost of France’s armed forces in its era of ―national 
greatness‖ were stupendous, with expenditure on the army by the period 1708-1714 
averaging 218 million livres, whereas during the Dutch War of 1672-1678 it had averaged 
only 99 million in nominal terms. This was due to the increasing size of the army and the 
navy and to the decline in the purchasing power of the French livre. However, the overall 
burden of war remained roughly similar in this period: War expenditures accounted for about 
57 percent of total expenditure in 1683, and approximately 52 percent in 1714. As for all the 
main European monarchies, it was the expenditure on war that brought fiscal change to 
France, especially after the Napoleonic wars.
52
  
In the 18
th
 century, rapid population growth in Europe swelled the ranks of armies, 
especially the Russian army. In Western Europe, a mounting intensity of warfare began with 
the Seven Years’ War (1756-1763) and culminated in the French Revolution and Napoleon’s 
campaigns (1792-1815). The new style of warfare brought on by the revolutionary wars, with 
conscription and war of attrition as new elements, is also reflected in the growth of army 
sizes. For example, the French army grew over 3.5 times in size from 1789 to 1793, up to 
650,000 men. Similarly, the British army grew from 57,000 in 1783 to 255,000 men in 1816. 
                                               
51 Eloranta, ―National Defense;‖ Henry Kamen, Empire: How Spain Became a World Power, 1492-1763, 1st 
American ed. (New York: HarperCollins, 2003), North, Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic 
Performance. 
52 Richard Bonney, ―France, 1494-1815,‖ in The Rise of the Fiscal State. War expenditure percentages (for the 
17th and 18th centuries) were calculated using the so-called Forbonnais (and Bonney) database(s), available from 
European State Finance Database, http://www.le.ac.uk/hi/bon/ESFDB/RJB/FORBON/forbon.html, and should 
be considered only illustrative. 
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The Russian army acquired the massive size of 800,000 men in 1816, and Russia kept the 
size of its armed forces at similar levels in the 19
th
 century.  
Figure 5. British (Public) Debt-to-NNI (Net National Income) Ratio (%), 1727-1838 
Debt-to-NNI ratio (%)
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Sources: Data graciously supplied by Gregory Clark. For more details, see Gregory Clark, 
―The Macroeconomic Aggregates for England, 1209-2008‖ (Davis, California: University of 
California at David Department of Economics, 2010). 
 . 
 
As Niall Ferguson has pointed out, Britain’s military burden and military spending 
rose and fell based on whether she was at war or not. The military burden levels in the 18
th
 
century varied between 4 and 18 percent. Such levels were rarely achieved in the 19
th
 and 
20
th
 centuries.
53
 Britain’s massive military outlays and her quest for supremacy over rivals, 
including extensive colonization, exerted growth pressures on her public debt as well. For 
example, after 1715 the British public debt represented more than 80 percent of the GNP, 
although the French level most likely exceeded 100 percent at that time. While the English 
fiscal system with its more democratic form of public debt and politics, and more advanced 
financial structure, enabled her to bear such a burden, France had a different experience. By 
                                               
53 Ferguson, The Cash Nexus, 45. 
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the eve of the French Revolution in 1788, France had a debt-to-GNP ratio of only 65 percent, 
and Britain’s was as high as 182 percent. Nonetheless, debt servicing in the French case 
amounted to 4.4 percent of the GDP, yet Britain only paid 6.0 percent of the GDP on interest 
payments. After 1815, the British debt-to-GNP ratio was over 300 percent, but the broad 
commitment to paying the public debt across the nation (if not the empire) enabled them to 
avoid default.
54
 
As we can see in Figure 5, a ratcheting-up effect influenced the debt-to-NNI ratios 
from the early 18
th
 to the 19
th
 centuries. The first upward push was exerted by the Seven 
Years’ War, then the American Revolution and finally by the French Revolutionary and 
Napoleonic conflicts. By itself, however, this data is not enough to confirm that a Peacock-
Wiseman pattern existed.  
Figure 6. Quandt-Andrews Breakpoint Tests, Differencing (I(1)) 
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Sources: Jari Eloranta and Jeremy Land, ―Hollow Victory: Britain’s National Debt and the 
Seven Years’ War‖ (Unpublished Manuscript, 2010). 
                                               
54 Macdonald, A Free Nation Deep in Debt. 
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The breakpoint analysis displayed in Figure 6 suggests that it may in fact be that the 
Seven Years’ War was even more substantial than the initial breakpoint tests suggested. It is 
quite possible that this shocked Britain’s fiscal system into a Peacock and Wiseman path, an 
upward trend towards more indebtedness due to the cost of transnational conflicts. This 
seems to have been the trigger toward deficit-spending and public debt as the main source for 
funding the British war efforts, and it also seems that the British got more used to this tool 
over time.
55
 If so, it was quite reasonable for British decision-makers, who were aware of the 
growing debt burden and inherent dangers in this development, to expect the rest of the 
Empire to share the costs as well. However, all parts of the Empire were not too happy about 
this, which directly contributed to the onset of the American Revolution. 
 
British Debates about the Public Debt and the Seven Years’ War 
 
As Niall Ferguson has argued, the current financial system that governments operate 
in the modern era developed because of the shortfall of national treasuries in times of 
conflict. Thus, loans from private citizens and other countries were solicited in order to 
continue prosecuting war. Yet the Seven Years’ War was much more expensive than 
previous wars in Britain’s history. Consequently, a heavier burden was placed on British 
taxpayers.  
 At the start of the war, Britain’s debt stood at £74.6 million (see Table 2), an 
enormous figure at the time. Yet, it remained a manageable sum that normally could have 
been sustained quite efficiently. However, by the end of the war, Britain’s debt increased to 
                                               
55 For more information on the Debt-to-NNI ratios and the breakpoint tests to test the impact of the ratio on the 
fiscal systems of Britain, see Jari Eloranta and Jeremy Land, ―Hollow Victory: Britain’s National Debt and the 
Seven Years’ War‖ Unpublished Manuscript, 2010. 
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£132.6 million, nearly twice the previous amount.
56
 Britain’s tax revenue and other sources 
of income were not enough to cover the cost of the war. Therefore, the funds were borrowed, 
amounting to approximately £58 million. Soon, prominent citizens were discussing the 
reasons for entering the war with France and questioning the necessity of the war. Phillip 
Stanhope, the Earl of Chesterfield and a political ally of William Pitt the Elder, wrote a letter 
to a friend in which he noted the general excitement over the announcement of war with 
France in 1756. He stated: ―In my opinion, our greatest danger arises from our expense, 
considering the present immense National Debt.‖ He continued, ―Where can France annoy us 
then? I see but two places; in America by slipping over in single ships a considerable number 
of troops; and next, by keeping us in a state of fear and expense at home.‖
57
 He argued that 
the war with France was essentially a no-win situation. Whether Britain won or lost, the cost 
of fighting the war would only accentuate the debt issue. As Table 2 shows, annual tax 
revenue increased slowly while annual military expenditures increased rapidly to such an 
extent that total annual tax revenue was doubled by annual military expenditures. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
56 J. Brewer, The Sinews of Power, 30. Though Brewer’s work is exceptional, his debt figures differ from J. J. 
Grellier’s figures in his book:  The History of the National Debt from the Revolution in 1688 to the Beginning of 
1800 (London: B. Franklin, 1810). Grellier shows that by 5 January 1757 British debt stood at £76,480,886 and 
by 5 January 1763 its debt had risen to £135,691,313, slightly higher than Brewer’s figures. Brewer’s figures 
are based on Parliamentary papers from 1868-1869, and Grellier’s book was originally published in 1810, much 
less removed from the Seven Years’ War than Brewer’s source. However, during the early 18th century British 
politicians were obsessed with the national debt problem and the Napoleonic Wars. Thus, in the interest of 
simplicity and historical accuracy, Brewer’s figures are used for this section of the thesis. 
57 Letter from Lord Chesterfield to Solomon Dayrolles, printed in Bradshaw, ed., The Letters of Philip Dormer 
Stanhope, Earl of Chesterfield  (London: Swan Sonnerschein and Company, 1905) , 1146. 
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Table 2. British National Debt: 1689-1784 (in British pounds, £) 
War Average 
annual 
expenditure 
Average 
annual tax 
revenue 
Debt 
Begin End 
1689-97      
Nine Years War 5,456,555 3,640,000                  -- 16,700,000 
     
1702-13     
War of Spanish 
Succession 
7,063,923 5,355,583 14,100,000 36,200,000 
     
1739-48     
War of Austrian 
Sucession 
8,778,900 6,422,800 46,900,000 76,100,000 
     
1756-63     
Seven Years War 18,036,142 8,641,125 74,600,000 132,600,000 
     
1775-84     
American War 20,272,700 12,154,200 127,300,000 242,900,000 
Source: Brewer, Sinews of War, 30. 
 
 The debt also became a heated topic of debate in Parliament. William Pitt, Britain’s 
Secretary of State of the Southern Department for most of the war, faced serious opposition 
in the Parliament. Pitt maintained that his main objective was to secure the French colonies in 
North America, especially Canada. Therefore, he prosecuted the war in North America more 
fiercely than on the European continent. In fact, he allied with Frederick the Great of Prussia 
in an effort to limit the actions of the British military on the continent.
58
 Deriding Pitt’s 
overall strategy for victory, some Members of Parliament insisted that the continuation of the 
war would be economically ruinous and that it was ―perfect suicide to go on conquering what 
must be surrendered.‖
59
 These MPs argued that the colonies were not worth the heavy 
                                               
58 Middleton, The Bells of Victory, 57-63. See also G. Williams, The Expansion of Europe in the Eighteenth 
Century: Overseas Rivalry, Discovery, and Exploitation (New York: Walker Company, 1966), 78-79. It must 
be noted that the British paid an annual subsidy to Prussia for her services during the war, further exacerbating 
to the debt problem beyond just the aspects discussed in this thesis. 
59 Speech Given before Parliament 13 November 1755, printed in John Almon, ed., Anecdotes of the Life of the 
Right Honorable William Pitt, Earl of Chatham: And of the Principal Events of His Time: With His Speeches in 
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financial burden, suggesting that any gains would have to be returned as part of a peace 
settlement.  
 Furthermore, other politicians insisted that the main concern of the war should be the 
European continent. They submitted a proposal that would establish an alliance of European 
powers in the war against France, arguing that British expenditures should be used to buy 
allies in the war. Pitt adamantly refused to consider such a proposal, reiterating that the major 
objective should be North America. In a speech reacting to the proposal, Pitt exclaimed: 
―This unsizable [sic] project, impracticable and desperate as it is… will, if fully pursued, 
bring bankruptcy upon Great Britain.‖ He added that the amount of money necessary to 
fulfill such a proposal would greatly harm ―the maintenance of our just and necessary war in 
North America.‖
60
 He was greatly concerned about the amount of debt that already existed 
before the war. He stated: 
And when we consider that such immense issues of money, out measuring any 
experiment of past time, are to be supplied by new loans, heaped upon a debt 
of eighty millions, who will answer for the consequence, or insure us from the 
fate of the decayed states of antiquity?
61
 
 
Pitt questioned the necessity of an alliance when the war in North America was more 
important, in his view, and decided that if a war that large was already occurring across the 
Atlantic, there was no reason to increase the already problematic debt for an unworthy cause. 
Additionally, he believed that in a free country it was not appropriate ―load our posterity with 
intolerable burdens.‖
62
 Thus, even the men who approved of the war against France were 
                                                                                                                                                 
Parliament, from the year 1736 to the year 1778 (London: Printed for L. B. Seeley, 1797) Rhinehart Collection, 
Appalachian State University, 239-241. 
60 Speech Given before Parliament 13 November 1755, printed in Almon, Anecdotes of the Life of the Right 
Honorable William Pitt, Earl of Chatham: And of the Principal Events of His Time, 239. 
61 Ibid., 240. 
62 Ibid., 241. 
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concerned with the impact it would have on the national debt. Despite his reservations, 
though, Pitt was the man who sent Britain spiraling into deficit spending and larger public 
debt. 
Why should we focus on Pitt rather than other major players in the government like 
the Duke of Newcastle? For one, Pitt held an unusual amount of power among the political 
elite. He was extremely popular with the citizens of the Britain as well. In any case, it is Pitt 
who proposed, along with several of his supporters, that North America be the primary 
objective. Though he mistrusted the Prussians, Pitt wanted to pay Frederick the Great and his 
army to wage the continental war with France, freeing Britain’s navy and army to do battle 
with France on the oceans and in the colonies. 
As Howard Peckham points out, the usual cycle of conquest and return in North 
America shaped policy in the early part of the war under Newcastle. However, when Pitt 
joined the ministry, the strategy changed drastically. Pitt pushed for permanent control once 
an area or objective was taken. Thus, it became state policy to pressure France in all corners 
of the globe, not just on the frontier. As a result, the fighting was not left to frontiersmen and 
colonists, but the professional military was directly involved. It became clear that new 
expenses came with the expansion of the military’s role in a global war.
63
 
How can we measure the impact of the addition of North America as a major theater? 
There is not a completely accurate way to do this, but we can compare the Seven Years’ War 
total expenditures with those of the War of Austrian Succession, which was a conflict 
contained on the European continent. The Seven Years’ War cost the British Empire £161 
million while the War of Austrian Succession cost £96 million, nearly £70 million less than a 
                                               
63 Peckham, The Colonial Wars, 1689-1762, 161; Middleton, The Bells of Victory, 9-13. 
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war that was two years shorter (see Table 3).
64
 What then caused the Seven Years’ War to be 
so much more expensive for Britain than the War of Austrian Succession? One theory is the 
global nature of the Seven Years’ War. Indeed, many historians call it the first global war. 
William R. Nester points out that the Seven Years’ War was the first fought on several 
continents at once. Battles were fought in North America, Europe and on the high seas. Both 
Britain and France used their alliances in Europe and their colonies across the globe for 
soldiers, supplies and raw materials.
65
 Yet, the War of Austrian Succession was also fought 
on the high seas. Not only were the navies involved, but colonies were attacked and invaded, 
especially in British India and the West Indies.
66
 Therefore, it is incorrect to argue that the 
global nature of the Seven Years’ War is the only reason for the disparity in total costs. 
Table 3. Cost of Major British Wars: 1689-1815 
Name, years of war  (millions of pounds, £ ) 
Grand Alliance (1688-97) 49 
Spanish Succession (1702-13) 94 
Austrian Succession (1739-48) 96 
Seven Years' War (1756-63) 161 
American (1776-83) 236 
Napoleonic Revolution (1793-1815) 1,658 
Source: Brauer and Tuyll, Castles, Battles, and Bombs, 140. 
  
It is made clear by Peckham and Middleton that the Seven Years’ War was the first 
war in which the British colonies in North America – and the conflict there in particular – 
were backed by the British Treasury. Pitt promised the colonies that whatever monies were 
spent in the effort to defeat France would be reimbursed. Furthermore, Pitt and Newcastle 
sent larger contingents of soldiers to North America in order to fight France, in comparison 
                                               
64 Brauer and Tuyll, Castles, Battles, & Bombs, 140. 
65 W. R. Nester, The First Global War: Britain, France, and the Fate of North America, 1756-1775 (Westport, 
Connecticut: Praeger, 2000), viii-ix. 
66 M. S. Anderson, The War of the Austrian Succession, 1740-1748 (London: Longman Publishing Group, 
1995), 178-92. 
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with previous wars in the American colonies.
67
 It is important to note that the American 
colonies were no longer the sole source of money and soldiers to prosecute the war on the 
frontier for Britain. Finally, Britain pursued the defeat of France in North America with the 
appropriate economic resources necessary to achieve this goal. The colonists were more 
willing to cooperate with Britain when promised financial assistance.  
 
Conclusions 
As a result of the high levels of military spending by Pitt and his government, Britain 
saw a debt that doubled from the peacetime conditions before the war. Consequently, the 
high military spending became the catalyst for the expansion of taxes throughout the British 
Empire. Politicians and civilians were extremely concerned about the national debt before the 
war, and they saw their fears realized immediately following the war. As the effort to pay for 
the war debt exceeded the net national income of Britain in the decade following the war, 
politicians pushed the colonies for more revenue to cover the costs. Meanwhile, the Seven 
Years’ War led to a period of ratcheting-up in the size and the severity of wars. It was not 
necessarily its global nature that led to such high expenditures during the Seven Years’ War, 
since the War of Austrian Succession was fought on a similar scale. It was the addition of the 
American continent as a major theater of war that increased the expenditure to the point of 
fiscal explosion. 
Perhaps the major cause of the fiscal pressure was the substantially higher defense 
share England was burdened with as compared to other countries in Europe. Especially 
during the 18
th
 century, Denmark, Russia and Austria all had lower defense shares than 
England, though each was substantially involved in the great power wars of the 18
th
 century. 
                                               
67 Peckham, The Colonial Wars, 1689-1762, 161, 165-68.  
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However, the most important impact that the Seven Years’ War had upon the fiscal system of 
Britain is revealed by the breakpoint analysis. The war was a watershed for Britain’s 
involvement in major wars of the period and the trigger towards debt-funded wars and 
conflicts. As major wars increased in size and severity, national and public debt, particularly 
Britain’s, increased dramatically. But the war hit the nation harder than the American 
Revolution and the Napoleonic wars, because the politicians had yet to figure out a method in 
order to pay the war debt. Therefore, the Seven Years’ War and the period of unrest 
afterward suggest that the British economy developed the ability to shoulder the burden of 
heavy war debt as a kind of ―normalcy,‖ making the war an example for future wars and 
conflicts.  
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II. TRANSPORTATION 
 
 If national debt was such an issue, what made it so serious? This chapter focuses on 
two aspects that led to higher military spending: naval shipping and land transportation. It 
examines the cost of conveying military supplies and men from Britain to North America and 
the naval power necessary to protect those shipments. When supplies reached the coast 
another journey was required to take them to the soldiers in the field. This chapter also 
addresses the high cost of transporting supplies from the coast to the frontier, showing that 
the frontier was difficult to travel due to its dense forests and terrain. Thus, the North 
American theater of war placed ever-increasing strains on the British financial system, 
creating high levels of debt that eventually led to the independence of the American colonies 
and the dissolution of the British Empire on the North American continent. 
 
Naval Transportation: The British Navy and the War of Austrian Succession 
 Throughout the 18
th
 century, France and Britain were constantly at war on the high 
seas. As a result, Britain continuously operated a large naval force that kept the home islands 
safe from invasion. John Brewer has argued that the costly navy was an integral part of the 
powerful fiscal-military state that evolved in Britain during the 18
th
 century.
68
 Yet Brewer 
was not the first writer to portray the impact of naval operations on war and politics. Perhaps 
one of the most significant studies analyzing the influence of navy power throughout history 
is Alfred T. Mahan’s The Influence of Sea Power upon History, first published at the end of 
                                               
68 Brewer, Sinews of Power, 12. 
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the 19
th
 century. This work examined the long history of modern seafaring and the 
development of strong navies across the globe. In discussing the Seven Years’ War, Mahan 
contended that Britain’s navy was the primary reason for its victory over France.
69
 Yet naval 
power was an expensive undertaking that further expanded the debt.  
 Britain’s navy was well-established by the beginning of the war. In fact, the War of 
Austrian Succession is widely regarded as a watershed for the Royal Navy. The Austrian 
war, lasting from 1739 to 1748, was the first time that Britain’s navy outperformed French 
naval power, and it established Britain as the dominant naval power on earth. Additionally, it 
was the first time that Britain had to transport a lot of men and supplies across the Atlantic to 
battlefields in the New World. Therefore, the War of Austrian Succession’s supply chains 
became the foundation on which Britain’s administration built its successful campaign during 
the Seven Years’ War.
70
  
 It is important to bear in mind the high cost of shipping supplies from Britain to 
America. Although both wars saw battles in the French and British colonies in the Western 
Hemisphere, the Seven Years’ War was fought mainly on the North American continent, a 
vast area. More men and supplies were needed; consequently, more ships were needed. 
Throughout the entire war, Britain spent over £45 million on the navy, over twenty-five 
percent of the war’s total cost.
71
 In 1758 alone, the net expenditure of the British government 
was £13.2 million. British naval expenditures totaled £3,803,000, nearly 30 percent of all the 
government’s expenditures.
72
 
                                               
69 A. T. Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History: 1660-1783 (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 
1890), 328-29. 
70 Syrett, Shipping and Military Power, 1-2. 
71 Daniel Baugh, ―Why Did Britain Lose Command of the Sea?‖ in Jeremy Black and Philip Woodfine, eds., 
The British Navy and the Use of Naval Power in the Eighteenth Century (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 
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Private Merchants 
 However expensive the Royal Navy became, one aspect is often overlooked. Private 
ships were frequently contracted to carry supplies and men to North America and Europe. 
The normal rate for transport to Europe remained steady at just over £4 per ton.
73
 
Unfortunately for the British, the cost to transport goods to North America was higher. In 
fact, it became so expensive that long-term charters were given to private owners to carry 
freight at a lower cost, but on a regular monthly basis. The rate for ships with long-term 
charters was 10 shillings per ton per month. At a time when travel across the Atlantic took 
several months one way, the cost increased dramatically. The Naval Board spent more than 
£46,000 just on shipping basic naval supplies to North America and the West Indies rather 
than use precious space on Navy vessels.
74
  
 Admiral Lord Rodney, commander of a fleet under Admiral Richard Hawke, was 
responsible for shipping supplies and men to the West Indies and North America. In a letter 
to a comrade in May 1762, he explained his orders to send 1,600 tons of supplies and troop 
ships to Jamaica. He remarked that only enough ships to carry 700 tons were readily 
available because the remaining ships required significant repairs to make them sea-worthy. 
Soon he found enough ships to fulfill his mission, sending the remaining 900 tons when the 
transports were ready to sail. All the supplies were on private ships chartered for naval 
service. The cost for each month that the convoys were at sea totaled £800.
75
 
                                               
73 Syrett, Shipping and Military Power, 10-11. A Naval ton is based in volume rather than weight. A 
complicated equation is used to determine a ship’s water displacement levels by which volume can be 
calculated. 
74 Ibid., 11-13. 
75 Lord Rodney to John Cleveland, 31 May 1762, printed in Godfrey B. Mundy, The Life and Correspondence 
of the Late Admiral Lord Rodney (Boston: Gregg Press, 1972), 1:86-93. 
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 Early on in the conflict, troops were sometimes ferried to North America and the 
West Indies by private ships, but the navy was charged passenger rates. Each ship had 
various prices for passengers, and soon the Navy Board was overcome with all the differing 
prices and paper work. Shortly thereafter, the Navy Board called for 10,000 tons of transport 
ships to be chartered with carrying soldiers to the New World. However, many ships were 
not suited to the transport of soldiers. Most ships had to be refitted with holds that could 
safely accommodate the human cargo. During the six months between 1 December 1757 and 
4 June 1758, a single dock company, Deptford Dockyard, charged the Navy Board £2,792 in 
labor and supplies to refit private ships for the transportation of soldiers and horses.
76
 
 Besides the shipping and refitting costs, the British Navy was financially responsible 
for chartered ships captured or sunk by the French. A ship named Generous Friends was 
captured by the French, and the Navy Board paid the owners more than £1,200 in order to 
fulfill its agreement. If a ship was recaptured, the British government would own the deed 
and the owner forfeited all rights to the vessel. Beyond reimbursing the owners who lost 
ships to the French, the navy paid for all repairs and refitting needed for chartered ships 
damaged by actions with enemy vessels. If the owners were forced to pay ransom for ships 
captured by the French, the navy would cover this in full. One particular case saw the British 
pay a bounty of nearly £500 for just one ship.
77
 As a result of the continued loss of merchant 
vessels, the British Navy had to charter more ships each year in order to either replace lost 
ships or fulfill its growing need to transport soldiers and supplies to North America. Even 
though the private merchant fleet cost Britain enormous sums of money, the Royal Navy was 
much more expensive. 
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The Royal Navy 
  Immediately following the declaration of war by the Crown, the Royal Navy 
endeavored to increase the size of its battle fleet. The peacetime crew levels numbered 
around 7,000 men. Within the first six weeks, however, the Royal Navy nearly doubled the 
amount to 13,000. Only impressments and direct payments were used to achieve this feat, 
when it took the same amount of time to produce three thousand soldiers in 1739. A 5,000-
strong Marine contingent was also formed under the direct control of the Navy Board. 
Additionally, the dockyards needed more men and supplies in order to meet the large demand 
for new ships. The Navy Board also needed a larger supply force to feed the increasing 
number of sailors and soldiers heading to war. By 1756, the Royal Navy had quadrupled in 
size. In total, the navy had over 200 ships commissioned, including eighty-eight ships of the 
line. The Austrian war only had a maximum of ninety-four ships of the line commissioned 
throughout the entire war. Furthermore, over 40,000 men were in the service, slightly below 
the maximum number used in the previous war as well.
78
 
 Unfortunately for the British, a series of early defeats and losses to inclement weather 
reduced the naval force by 14,000 men. The ships that had priority for repairs and 
reinforcements were those destined for the North American theater. Therefore, a fleet that 
was to be built for actions in the Mediterranean was put on hold so that the Royal Navy could 
replace the 14,000 men and ships necessary for the Western fleet. By 1759, the navy reached 
its maximum size of 300 ships and 82,000 men under arms. Each year following 1759, the 
number of contracts for new ships fell from the previous year.
79
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 Building new ships was an expensive undertaking. The largest factory operating in 
Britain during the period cost approximately £5,000 to build. A moderate-sized 74-gun ship 
for the Royal Navy cost approximately £50,000, ten times the cost of the factory. Once built, 
the ship only would last an average of ten to fifteen years if it was not sunk or captured by 
the enemy. Furthermore, repairs, outfitting and supplying each ship forced the British to 
divert large amounts of money to the navy in order for it to operate efficiently. The Royal 
Navy used nearly every available port during the war, forcing owners of merchant vessels 
(which were many times in the pay of the British Navy) to make more costly repairs in 
friendly ports outside Britain.
80
 
 
Problems with Shipping 
 Throughout the entire war, supplies from Britain had to be shipped across the Atlantic 
Ocean. Ships were constantly sailing back and forth between North America and Europe 
bringing men, supplies and ammunition. Many times, shipments were either delayed or 
stopped completely by weather, pirates or enemies. Therefore, the most pressing issue for 
any commander was the securing of shipments and supplies for the men in the field. This was 
an exhausting and thankless task. General Jeffrey Amherst, commander of British military 
forces in North America from 1759 until the end of the conflict, was bombarded with 
requests for supplies by his officers in the field nearly every day. He had to arrange the 
transportion of goods throughout the colonies once they reached American harbors.
81
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 The tonnage detailed in Amherst’s schedule of ships on 15 December 1760, is 
remarkable in itself. There were only five ships headed to Charleston, South Carolina. 
Amherst listed each ship with its current tonnage and the particular units of soldiers sent 
along to help with unloading and distribution. The total tonnage for the five ships was 2,259 
tons, a staggering figure for any one man to organize.
82
 Assuming that the ships made it 
safely to Charleston, the cost of shipping was extremely high. 
 One can estimate the cost of the entire shipment by examining the charge for a 
smaller cargo that reached Charleston to Edmund Atkin, superintendent of Indian Affairs in 
the Southern States, in 1757. Considering that sixty-seven packages, maybe weighing five 
tons, cost just above £36 to ship to Charleston from England, prices were affixed to the 
weight of the cargo being shipped.
83
 Therefore, changing the cost of shipping five tons to £25 
to adjust for variables, the cost of shipping the 2,259 tons of cargo would be £11,295. This is 
just one shipment of supplies to one sector of the continent. The seas were relatively easy to 
travel by this time as well, but enemy ships and pirates patrolled all major sea lanes and made 
it difficult to find insurance. Consequently, prices, especially insurance costs, were extremely 
high even for royal navy vessels. Private ships from Britain and France (and many from 
neutral nations) made fortunes shipping for both sides during the war.  
 Naval debt became the most serious problem facing the Navy Board throughout the 
war. In 1749, British naval debt stood at £3,072,472, a year removed from the end of the War 
of Austrian Succession. By 31 December 1762, the debt had increased to £5,929,125, 
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demonstrating the war’s impact on the entire national debt.
84
 In any case, the Seven Years’ 
War was a milestone for the British Navy. For the first time it gained superiority over the 
French Navy, and Britain soon emerged as the most influential power on the high seas, not 
losing that distinction until World War I when the United States achieved predominance. 
Although the high costs of operating the navy placed an enormous strain on the British 
economy, Britain’s economy was better prepared and able to withstand such a cost better 
than the economies of its enemies. However, the high costs did not end with maritime forces. 
 
Transportation on the Frontier: Road Construction 
 Once the maritime shipment was unloaded onto docks, a much more difficult journey 
was made to reach the place where the supplies were to be delivered. The North American 
frontier was still dominated by massive forests and dense wilderness. For Europeans whose 
homelands were completely altered by human hands, vast expanses of forests were 
problematic. Not only were Indians lurking around each tree and brush (or so the British 
thought), but the roads that led through the dense forests were barely able to accommodate 
even a small cadre of soldiers. Supplies had to be carried by soldiers, horses and mules. 
Rarely could the supplies be moved in wagons and other heavy transport vehicles. In many 
instances, supplies were distributed wherever there was an open clearing or town. Human 
labor was insufficient to transport heavy artillery across long distances. Therefore, road 
construction was necessary in order for heavy artillery to be transported to forts and 
battlefields. 
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In Arms for Empire, Douglas Edward Leach argues that General Braddock’s defeat in 
1755 was a direct result of the need to transport heavy artillery to capture Fort Duquesne. In 
order for Braddock to reach Fort Duquesne with the cannons, a large labor force was 
necessary to turn the small wilderness trail into a road that could carry artillery and the horse 
and mule trains that were needed. The large labor force became a burden that required more 
supplies and transports. Consequently, an already slow-moving force was delayed further by 
the sheer size of the column. Surprise and stealth were no longer achievable. Native 
Americans were able to discover the force and its vulnerabilities with little difficulty, leading 
to the massacre of Braddock’s men in the wilderness near the Monongahela River.
85
After 
Braddock’s defeat, British commanders realized the need for smaller and more effective 
fighting units. Not only did they require irregular fighting units, they wanted soldiers who 
could travel lightly and swiftly through dense areas of forests.
86
 
Traveling quickly was nearly impossible with the terrible condition of roads 
throughout the areas under contention. Especially in the wilderness, relatively short trips 
were made long by sandy or wet roads, making travel with wagons difficult at best. One 
official in the British ranks complained that it took too long to receive goods to trade with 
Indians for the immediate needs. In his estimation: 
It would delay the expedition too long to wait until they could be carried to 
Keowee, which is generally the work of a month or five weeks for loaded 
wagons, the distance is 300 miles, the road very sandy, and the horses are the 
worst in the world.
87
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As this remark makes clear, poor road conditions and the quality of the horses found in North 
America made a difficult situation even worse. Since the roads were in such terrible shape, 
new roads and repairs for those already in existence became necessary for moving troops and 
supplies consistently and effectively.  
The need for an extensive labor force to build and maintain roads through the 
wilderness was obvious to Colonel Henry Bouquet, commander of a regiment in the southern 
sector throughout the war (and famous for his capture of Fort Duquesne in 1758). In a bill he 
sent to Lord Loudoun, Commander in Chief in North America until his removal in 1759, 
Bouquet listed the costs of blazing trails and supplying the laborers. He explained that the 
£5,000 sent to him had already been spent and asked Loudoun to send him more money so 
that he could finish his mission to defend a small town. The town also needed barracks for 
the soldiers to sleep in and new roads and trails outside the walls to move supplies and 
troops. Interestingly, Bouquet used black men as his main source of labor. He stated that ―we 
have agreed that they should work 6 hours every day, for 3S. 6d. or 6d. St. (sterling) to which 
they add a gill of rum.‖
88
 
Beyond labor costs, trail blazing required enormous sums in supplies and additional 
transports. British officers were often incapable of providing the large number of transports 
necessary to supply even small contingents of soldiers. During the war, the British 
government enacted few laws that allowed the British military to requisition wagons and 
horses in North America. Even when impressment laws were passed, they were rarely 
enforced effectively. Instead, horses and wagons not owned by the British government had to 
be purchased or rented. In 1761, the cost to hire a single wagon was approximately £4 per 
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day. Several attempts were made by British officers and officials to lower the cost, with little 
success.
89
  
Bouquet faced the same issues during the Forbes Expedition to capture Fort 
Duquesne. One of his supply officers sent him an estimate of the total number of wagons 
needed to carry food stores for the campaign. He sent for over two hundred barrels of pork 
for the expedition. At the cost of £4 per wagon, the total equaled £120 per day.
90
 One month 
later the expedition was beginning to move and he needed another 100 wagons, totaling over 
£400 per day. The expedition did not leave until the latter days of August 1758 and did not 
complete its mission until 25 November. Only counting from 1 September, the total cost to 
for the wagons necessary for Bouquet’s regiment exceeded £34,400. In addition to the 
wagons, over a thousand pack horses were needed for the campaign, further adding to the 
financial costs.
91
 
Another illustration of the heavy fees associated with transporting military goods to 
the frontier concerns John St. Clair, officer in charge of supply in Pennsylvania. His attempt 
to ship 80,000 pounds of flour to Pittsburgh shows how expensive it could be to move basic 
foodstuffs. He noted that the total cost was slightly more than £4,322 (he was quick to point 
out that he had made a saving of £1,122 to the Crown because of his negotiations) to send the 
goods to Pittsburgh. The cost of the flour itself was only £400, just 9.25 percent of the entire 
cost.
92
 Thus, over 90 percent of the expense was accrued in the procuring of horses, feed, 
saddle bags and horse drivers. This clearly indicates that by far the largest portion of supply 
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costs on the frontier was used to get the materials from one place to another, rather than to 
buy the materials themselves. 
By 1759, British forces in North America were already experiencing severe budget 
constraints. In a description of the difficulties faced by his army, Bouquet mentioned the 
number of wagons that he needed to continue prosecuting the war. Nearly 1,300 wagons 
were needed, but Virginia and Pennsylvania could only provide 600. Furthermore, he 
explained that in the course of its operations his army had acquired debts that needed to be 
paid. He did not think that the colonies would provide the necessary funding to pay off his 
past debts. The debt totaled nearly £100,000, and unless they could find the money to pay the 
debts, Bouquet wrote, his forces would have to slow down and wait for funds to be sent from 
Britain.
93
 
 
Road Maps 
Among the many difficulties that traveling through the frontier caused for the British, 
the most important part of planning campaigns was gathering the transports and laborers 
necessary for the long trips. In determining the amount of transports and laborers needed, the 
distance to be traveled and the time it would take had to be investigated. Bouquet sent men 
out regularly to investigate roads that already existed or to create new roads along the best 
possible route. One such man was George Washington. In August 1758, Washington wrote to 
Bouquet asking ―if it requires more time, or is it more difficult and expensive to go 145 miles 
in a good road already made to our hands, or to cut a road 100 miles in length, great part of 
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which, over almost inaccessible mountains.‖
94
 It appears that Washington tired of building 
roads that only seemed to take longer and cost more money when roads already existed that 
could be used more quickly and cheaply. Yet the young Virginian completed his mission and 
continued to determine the distances that could be taken by different routes to Fort 
Duquesne. He described two different routes, marking each different road and turn in 
mileage on each. The first route was only 193 miles long, but the route was strewn with 
broken wagons and was much less likely to suit Bouquet’s force. The second route was listed 
as 212 miles, but it was much easier and in better shape for use by the British forces.
95
 
Bouquet’s papers include many detailed descriptions of roads and distances. One 
particular officer’s entire mission was to produce reports on roads that could be traveled by 
Bouquet’s forces once they reached the point that Washington had mapped. Patterson noted 
that the distance from the last stop to Fort Duquesne was 50 miles. Each road had a 
description of its condition and capability of holding Bouquet’s soldiers and supplies. Certain 
areas that were of interest to the Colonel were noted, such as good places to camp and get 
water and rest.
96
 
 
Forts 
The unpredictability of roads, trails, provisioning and natives led to the development 
of a system of forts for the protection of supply lines throughout the frontier. Small 
settlements became outposts and small towns were converted into forts.
97
 This new system 
added to an already existing chain of forts that were inadequate to stem French and Indian 
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advances. The fort system served several purposes. In order to protect frontier 
communications and supply routes, forts were needed at crossroads, villages and at the line 
of defense. In order for Britain to adapt its forces and tactics to frontier conditions, extensive 
supply routes had to be prepared and protected. Thus, forts became the most essential aspect 
of this. Soon after the outbreak of war, both Britain and France were forced to begin massive 
building and repair projects all across the frontier. Though wood was abundantly available, 
manning the forts and supplying the cannons, guns and ammunition became an expensive 
undertaking. Not only was it expensive, but all the guns and ammunition had to be brought 
from the coast, adding further to the time and effort required to wage war on the frontier.  
The British were aware that the French were much better prepared with sixty to 
seventy forts and nearly as many settlements spread across the frontier by the beginning of 
the war.
98
 Furthermore, those forts the British did have were in a state of disrepair. An 
official charged with reporting on the condition of fortifications in western New York wrote 
in June 1756 to convey ―a true idea of the nature of these places.‖ He continued, ―[My 
comrade] is at Oswego and has sent down a much worse report of that place and we are only 
indebted to the want of ability or bad conduct of the enemy for its being in our possession; as 
of itself it could have made no defense.‖
99
 The British endeavored to equal or surpass the 
number of French establishments with forts and outposts of their own. 
As well as repairing existing forts, the British built new forts and barracks in and 
around towns all over the coastal and western portions of the southern colonies. In one 
particular case, Bouquet requested £7,000 to help offset the cost of building defenses around 
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the town of Fort Prince, Georgia.
100
 Additionally, forts were built to protect coastal areas 
from the frontier. When Bouquet was sent to Charleston, South Carolina, he noticed that the 
fortifications in and around the city were not up to standard. He sent a letter to Loudoun 
asking for more money to supplement the £9,000 already set aside for the development of 
better forts and works for the city. He made it clear that, without extra funding, Charleston 
remained in danger of being captured by the French. Yet he was more concerned about the 
lack of protection from hostile Indian tribes, for Charleston was surrounded by forest, and 
situated close to the frontier.
101
 
Forts were built by officers all across the frontier. Some forts were more expensive 
than others. Fort Cumberland, built and named in the Duke of Cumberland’s honor, initially 
cost £10,000 to build and man. It continued to need money for maintenance and supplies. All 
the while, the fort’s bastions were expanded upon as long as the soldiers were stationed 
there.
102
 When French forts were captured, they were repaired and refitted for British use. In 
one instance, £10,000 was sent to Ohio Territory to repair several forts taken, but budget 
constraints sometimes forced the British to limit repairs to aesthetic maintenance. A fort 
could thereby be made to look more formidable even if it was not in fact rendered so.
103
 
  Fort building was not limited to the frontier or southern colonies. Rhode Island was 
given £15,000 for repairing, outfitting and enlarging the fort protecting Newport from naval 
attack. Nearly all the money was spent on cannons, men and supplies, and Rhode Island 
officials asked for more money to continue expanding the protection the colony considered 
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imperative.
104
 Unfortunately, Rhode Island saw little action during the war making the 
additions an unnecessary expenditure. In preparing for war, the North American colonies 
quickly petitioned the government for as much monetary support as possible, each group 
insisting that it was important to protect their colony first. As a result, the costs of shipping 
and protecting the supplies so desperately needed to continue the war placed a heavy burden 
on the taxpayers in Britain and the public treasury.  
 
Conclusions 
 
 The Seven Years’ War experience shows how urgent the need was to provide the 
goods necessary to conduct effective military campaigns. Martin van Creveld argues that 
supply is the single most important factor in war. He points to both world wars as examples, 
though he contends that Napoleon was the one who revolutionized military supply 
systems.
105
 In fact, it could be argued that Britain made the first step in revolutionizing the 
supply process, using naval transportation as the principal method. However, transporting 
goods was neither cheap nor easy. Britain discovered that it was very expensive to ship these 
goods, but of course it was necessary in fighting wars over long distances. 
Transporting the goods necessary to conduct a successful war created problems for 
future generations. Transportation was not the only reason for an increase in Britain’s 
national debt and military expenditures. Many other factors played a role, including the 
frontier, subsidies paid to the colonies and Prussian states and the growth of the British army. 
However, transportation affected all other factors. Without the effectiveness of Britain’s 
transportation system, Britain would not have defeated France. 
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III. PRICE OF LOYALTY: NATIVE AMERICANS AND BRITISH TACTICAL 
CHANGES 
 
 Though transporting goods was difficult and expensive, another problem affected 
transportation and military operations in North America. Native Americans held an 
advantage when negotiating with both of the belligerent powers. Beyond slowing 
transportation and participating in military campaigns, the natives had a social, economic and 
political impact on the Seven Years’ War. When armies needed cross tribal lands, their 
commanders had to deal directly with the chief or chiefs of those tribes. Armies presented 
―gifts‖ in order to satisfy the wants and needs of Indian tribes throughout the frontier. This 
added a significant expense to the already high levels of military expenditure and historically 
high debt levels.  
 This practice of giving gifts to Native Americans in order to have better relations was 
not new, nor was it extraordinary. In The Middle Ground, Richard White shows that the 
Native Americans conducted diplomacy throughout the era of colonization as separate 
nations or sovereign powers. Though cultural differences were difficult to overcome, 
Europeans and natives regularly conducted business together by finding a ―middle ground‖ 
of respect and understanding, and most tribes wanted to trade with the colonizers in order to 
obtain new weapons, clothes and other goods. During the Seven Years’ War, the Indians had 
no reason to believe that Europeans would treat them any differently.
106
 Soon, it became a 
race to gain native fighters in an effort to find combatants. In fact, American colonists were 
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more difficult to please than were the Native Americans, as seen with their price gouging and 
refusal to allow their horses and wagons to be used for military campaigns. Even though it 
was standard practice to give gifts to natives for cooperation, the Seven Years’ War saw a 
substantial increase in the number and quality of the gifts offered and the costs to satisfy 
natives. 
 
The Economic Impact of the Native Americans 
 The frontier forced the British to subdue the Native Americans in their path or be 
subject to attacks that would disrupt their military campaigns. Therefore, the Indians held an 
exceptional advantage when in negotiations with British officers and officials. The Indians 
could never hope to withstand a full-scale war with the British. However, the Indians could 
cause extremely long delays by quick strikes along the paths through the dense forests. The 
British could not hope to pass through a particular area of forest without at least one minor 
skirmish. Although casualties caused by these frequent attacks were few, the delay cost the 
British time which could determine the outcome of battles.
107
 The British, consequently, 
needed large sums of money to gain native loyalties. 
 As a testament to this, Edmund Atkin, British Superintendent of Indian Affairs in the 
southern sector, complained about the inadequate funds he received from the colonial 
governments to help initiate trade and conclude a military alliance with the Cherokee tribe. In 
a letter to the lieutenant governor of Virginia in 1757, he explained that the £5,000 already 
set aside for his use would be ―very insufficient‖ to continue supplying the Cherokees with 
the goods that they needed. In fact, most of the money was used to hire and feed the horses 
that carried the goods to the Cherokees. Furthermore, Atkin was forced to pay £200 to buy a 
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license from the colony of North Carolina to trade with the Cherokees.
108
 In his letter, Atkin 
stressed both the costliness of purchasing native loyalties and the concept of treating native 
tribes as sovereign entities. Rather than use the word ―want,‖ he used the word ―need‖ when 
describing the goods supplied to the Indians. 
 General Jeffrey Amherst, who took command of the British forces in North America 
in 1759, was familiar with the problems of pacifying natives. As described in his papers, the 
colonial government of Virginia had initially used natives to prosecute the war against the 
French and their Indian allies. In October 1757, Edmund Atkin gave the colonial government 
of Virginia a bill that laid out the specifics for gathering more Indian allies. The bill included 
the cost of traveling for Atkin, goods to trade with the Indians and Indians hired to fight and 
guide the British through the frontier. The total cost amounted to nearly £900 sterling for just 
one small tribe of Indians.
109
 
 Once the colonial governments received the bill, they considered the question of who 
ought to pay Atkin. In a meeting of the governor and other officials in Virginia’s colonial 
government, a bill for Atkin’s and his aides’ services was challenged by officials. Some 
members of the government felt that the aides were unnecessary. They suggested that Atkin 
should apply to the King for repayment rather than to Virginia. They believed that the 
objective of pacifying natives and encouraging them to fight for Britain was purely the 
King’s concern and not theirs.
110
 In another instance, Atkin was forced to pay for certain gifts 
to supplement the £2,000 given to him by the British Army because the colonial assemblies 
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refused to give him additional monies. Some of the assemblies declared that he should not go 
any further ―unless entirely at the King’s expense.‖
111
 Evidently, the colonies were growing 
wary of paying for goods to supply Native Americans for war. 
 Beyond the goods bought for the Indians, Atkin needed men to carry the goods from 
the storehouse to the Indians. In a bill from 1759, Atkin specified that thirteen men had 
accompanied him throughout his journeys. For one year’s service he had paid his employees 
over £500 in wages. Food was not included in the bill and was more than likely included in a 
separate bill.
112
 In any case, judge from Atkin’s statement of one year of wages for thirteen 
men, the total amounted for all such personnel in Britain’s service for one year must have 
been considerable. 
 As an example, General Forbes sent Colonel Bouquet £800 worth of Indian goods to 
help ease his stay in Pennsylvania around the area of Fort Duquesne, near modern day 
Pittsburgh.
113
 Bouquet needed natives for several reasons. He relied upon them to guide his 
army through the wilderness, and when the British were compelled to stay in a fort or a town, 
Bouquet sent out Indian scouts to gather intelligence.
114
 British officers rarely sent their own 
soldiers into the frontier for scouting purposes, because Indians were better suited for the job. 
Colonists sometimes replaced natives, but it was a poor substitution at best. Therefore, native 
intelligence was held in high regard, further supporting the need for Native American allies. 
 Not only were the British buying their loyalties, but they were paying for every 
prisoner or dead enemy, French or Indian. In the same bill Atkin sent to the Virginian 
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government, he listed a price for the scalps and prisoners that the Indians had sold to him.
115
 
It is interesting to note that the British openly offered money for prisoners and the scalps of 
dead enemies (who may or may not have been enemies). In his instructions to his deputy, 
Christopher Gist, who had been sent on a mission to purchase more Indian allies, Atkin 
specifically stated what the price was to be for each scalp or prisoner: ―A reward of £45 is 
allowed to any Indian in amity with the inhabitants of this Colony (Virginia) for every Indian 
enemy taken prisoner by him; and a reward of £40 also for every Indian enemy killed or 
destroyed,‖ (for which a scalp could be presented to prove death). Atkin was not too happy 
about the policy, which was decreed by the colonial government, and advised Gist to exercise 
caution when paying the reward. Atkin was aware that the Indians were exceptionally adept 
at cheating the system. As he warned Gist:  
Cherokees in particular have found the art of making four [scalps] out of one 
enemy killed; and moreover, by such large rewards, private scalping is 
encouraged not only without any public benefit resulting from it… in as much 
as you know I have, by late experience, found them to be so many temptations 
to some Indians in amity with us to kill others that are our friends when they 
think they have a good opportunity…by finding them single or alone.
116
 
 
Atkin believed that the Indians were untrustworthy, and he knew that some of them were 
killing friendly Indians in order to receive larger rewards.  
 On 9 May 1758, a ship full of supplies earmarked for the Indians arrived at 
Charleston, South Carolina. The shipment included blankets, clothes, tobacco pipes, paint 
and jewelry, worth nearly £200 altogether. In addition, military supplies, also a part of the 
cargo, were intended for Indians with whom Atkin had made alliances. There were fourteen 
casks of bullets along with twelve chests of muskets, rifles and other small arms. To 
complement the small arms, twenty barrels of gun powder were on the ship. The military 
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supplies brought the total cost of the ship’s cargo to over £612. Including shipping (discussed 
in Chapter 2) the total cost of the shipment exceeded £648.
117
 Every single item was for 
Native Americans, who rarely fought for the same side throughout the war. Many times the 
same Native Americans bribed and armed by the British armed would change loyalties and 
use their weapons against instead of for Britain.
118
 
 
Figure 7: Example of Goods Used to Buy Loyalties 
50  Pound Weight
10
3
3
1  1/2
6
6
39
150
6
6
150
15
100
75
19 Silver Hair Bobs 
12 Silver Gorgets
4 Silver Wrestbands
4000 White Wompun
5 Horse Loads . . . . 624  1/2  Pound Weight
Wire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
   A  Return  of  Indian  Goods  to  be  Sent  to  Pittsbrough                    
from  Fort  Benford
To 25 Dozen of Glasp Knives about . . . . . . . .
Thread . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
10 Peices of Garting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
10 Pieces of Yellow binding . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4
1 Grose of Aul Blades . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
6 Dozen Jews Harps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
26 Check Shirts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
15 Pieces of half thicks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
7 Strouds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Vermilion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Tobacco . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
30 Pipe Tomahoakes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
25 Blankets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
25 English Match Coats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
about . . . . . . . . . . .
 
Source: List of Indian Goods, 13 Jan 1759, printed in The Papers of Colonel Henry Bouquet, 
47. 
 
                                               
117 Invoice of 67 Packages Containing Presents for Indians to Edmund Atkin, 9 May 1758, printed in Amherst 
Papers, 60-62. 
118 Anderson, Crucible of War, 267-269. 
65 
 
 
 
 Further increasing the cost to pacify and satisfy the Indians, each commander had the 
authority to supply gifts to Indians they met during their campaigns. In two separate requests 
from commanders on the frontier, Edmund Atkin would give a total of £89 to buy gifts and 
―presents,‖ as they were called, to help these commanders befriend the Indians they 
encountered.
119
 Requests like these were extremely common throughout the entire North 
American continent. Not only were the British extensively using bribes, rewards and gifts, 
but the French were using the same methods. Buying Indian loyalty was an expensive 
business. 
 Edmund Atkin sent General Amherst a list of expenses he incurred while traveling to 
Indian tribes all over the Southern colonies. He included the cost of all the supplies that he 
had not been paid for already by the colonial governments for the years 1757-1760. This 
particular list is extremely long and detailed, and it includes non-military items as well, such 
as necklaces, rings and food. The total amount that Atkin asked for was £2,491, with another 
£332 to be paid for his own services. The price of keeping Indians allied with the British 
grew throughout the war, and Atkin’s figures were only for three years at the very beginning 
of the war.
120
 Moreover, Atkin was not the only official traveling amongst the Indians in 
order to increase the size of Britain’s Indian forces in North America. 
 By the end of the war the relationship had soured between British army officials and 
native tribes. General Amherst began to seek dominance over the Indians and many of the 
tribes felt betrayed and resented the rejection of the ―middle ground‖ as the basis for trade 
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and cooperation.
121
 Soon, tribes revolted against the British. Unfortunately for the French, 
most of the revolts took place following France’s defeat on the continent. One particular 
rebellion by the Ohio Indians forced Colonel Henry Bouquet back into action against the 
same Indians he had once helped to arm and supply.
122
 Native Americans expected to be and 
were treated by the British as equals until the end of French presence in North America. 
 The Indians knew they had the opportunity to increase their wealth and influence. If 
one side offered more money, the Indians would change sides. Labor was in short supply on 
the frontier and the Indians were able to use collective bargaining effectively to make 
personal and tribal gains where and when they could. Therefore, the Indian labor supply was 
in high demand and forced the British and French to use more money than ever before to 
gain the support of the Indians. Both sides were competing for the same labor pool and it 
drove the price of Indian labor higher and higher. Britain was already operating with a high 
level of national debt, and the Seven Years’ War increased that debt.
123
 The problems 
associated with fighting a war on the North American frontier. The conduct of the Native 
Americans helped to push the British Empire into fiscal crisis and alienated the colonists who 
were doing what they could to help Britain win the war with France.   
 
The Cost of Operating a Frontier War 
During the War of Austrian Succession there were battles with 30,000-60,000 men in 
arms on both sides. In fact, it was rare for battles to occur with fewer than 10,000 men 
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involved.
124
 The disparity between the two wars in this respect is enormous. The Seven 
Years’ War on the North American continent rarely had battles with more than 5,000 soldiers 
involved. The only battles on the same scale as those in the War of Austrian Succession took 
place on the European continent.
125
 How could a war that used far fewer men in much 
smaller battles cost nearly twice than a war that lasted two years longer and used much larger 
numbers of soldiers in bigger battles? 
 Both wars were fought on a global scale and the lasted for nearly the same length of 
time. The key difference is that the North American continent became a major theater of war 
for the first time in colonial history. Unlike Europe by this time, North America had very 
little of its land mass settled and developed. The North American forests and mountains were 
still the dominant features on the continent. Natives remained a prominent force holding back 
development and settlers. Therefore, if a settler wanted to push further into the forest to move 
west, he had to consider how he was going to protect his family from possible Indian attacks. 
Most of all, the settler had to find a suitable place to build his home in vast and dense 
forests.
126
 
 Native American tribes and dense forests made the North American continent 
difficult to settle and develop. Conventional military forces could not penetrate the forests 
without taking weeks and months to lay out traversable roads. Therefore, when fighting 
broke out between France and Britain on the frontier, conventional military methods were 
ineffective. New units had to be established and new training for old units was developed to 
fight a war that would require guerilla-style fighting and movements. A New Hampshire-
born colonist, Major Robert Rogers, was charged with recruiting a company of soldiers 
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capable of fighting and moving efficiently in the frontier against the French.
127
 Rogers was 
well acquainted with life on the frontier and with Native American tactics. This made him 
invaluable to the British in developing new units that could fight in forests against Indians 
who knew the terrain better than any European. Rogers used fewer men with fewer supplies, 
but consistently employed Native Americans as guides and soldiers.
128
 
  In North America, the Seven Years’ War became a frontier war. Frontier 
engagements differed from pitched battles on the European continent in mainly two ways. 
For one, forests inhibited the movement of large groups of men; therefore, smaller numbers 
of soldiers were used so that movement was easier through densely forested areas. As 
Stephen Brumwell has noted, though some historians claim that the British imposed their 
way of warfare on the frontier, there is no evidence to support those assertions. In fact, there 
is more evidence to support the view that the war in North America was irregular at best and 
that the frontier imposed itself on the British. Consequently, the threat of ambush and 
irregular fighting forced the British to use small contingents of men in innumerable 
skirmishes and light engagements. The ―gentlemanly‖ style of fighting – lines of men taking 
turns shooting and the heavy reliance on cannon – hardly ever occurred on the frontier of 
North America.
129
  
 The increasingly smaller commands created another problem that added to the 
pressure on the already over-stretched military budget. In the British army during the 18
th
 
century, to be an officer was to be in an honored position. Aristocrats and higher-class 
citizens were the ones most able to obtain commissions as officers. For an officer, 
fraternizing with the lower ranks in his command was ―un-gentlemanly.‖ Therefore, officers 
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had to maintain a decorum that was expensive, and officers were paid much more and 
received larger rations than the privates under their command.
130
  
 The small units that operated quite independently of each other on the frontier created 
a need for more officers. Even for groups of soldiers a hundred in number, an officer had to 
be in command. During the War of Austrian Succession, officers were in command of much 
larger groups and units of men. There was no need to separate or divide armies to navigate 
the European continent.
131
 The British army commissioned an enormous number of officers 
during the Seven Years’ War. Each rank carried its own different pay scale and prestige. 
 Consequently, the high cost of warfare on the frontier was compounded by the 
number of officers being commissioned to lead these small parties of men. Along with the 
cost of officers, the pay for soldiers within the rank and file was also high. Many times, the 
paymaster had to pay soldiers in advance because of the length of time they would be out on 
the frontier. In 1760, according to records in General Amherst’s papers, the paymaster was 
asked to pay three different units for a month of service in an upcoming campaign. The 
largest unit of the three required a total of £1,479 for just sixty-one days. The total cost per 
day for this unit was a little over £24. The other units required total pay for that same month 
was just over £1,025, about £7 per day.
132
 This is just one example from one particular 
campaign. With hundreds of campaigns occurring at the same time, the cost of war on the 
frontier clearly outweighed the ability of the British government to finance it. Therefore, 
public credit was needed to secure the necessary funds, driving the national debt up to a level 
never seen before.  
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 Furthermore, the amount of supplies needed to feed and arm the entire army grew at 
exponential rates. For one soldier to survive the rigors of the march and fighting, one week’s 
rations were as follows: 
7 lb of bread – or in lieu thereof – 7 lb of flour 
7 lb of beef – or in lieu thereof – 4 lb of pork 
3 pints peas, 1 lb cheese – or in lieu thereof – 6 oz butter 
1 lb flour – or in lieu thereof – ½ lb rice
133
 
 
Each soldier was supposed to have these supplies every week, but rarely did supply officers 
have enough to fulfill the requirements. Many officers would buy whatever they needed and 
could find on their travels. Indian clothes, shoes and weapons (like knifes and tomahawks) 
were purchased to increase the effectiveness of British soldiers on the frontier, further 
increasing the amount of money spent on the average soldier.
134
 The cost to keep soldiers and 
officers in the field increased as the war dragged on. 
 As Britain’s finances were stretched to the limit, American colonists were 
increasingly wary of supporting the war on the frontier. One officer wrote in 1759 about the 
trouble he had when trying to gather what was necessary to continue fighting. He remarked 
that he had no connections with the colonials in the place where he was attempting to buy 
supplies. In response to his requests, colonists refused to take British credit and promises of 
payment in place of specie. He was able to procure some of what he needed, and requested 
that he be sent coin so he could buy the rest.
135
 Bouquet, meanwhile, was having trouble 
paying the colonial soldiers in his regiment. In response, General Forbes sent £700 to help 
cover the shortfall in Bouquet’s budget.
136
 By doing so, he kept colonists in the ranks for a 
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few more months. Colonists were much harder to please in instances where protecting a fort 
was necessary. At Fort Duquesne, American militia threatened to leave the fort nearly 
unprotected unless they were given their pay. As the Americans were highly restless, 
Bouquet wrote to them personally asking for more time. He pleaded with the captain for just 
another month or two to help resolve the issue.
137
 Ultimately, this was a sign that the colonies 
were growing dissatisfied with certain aspects of the relationship between them and the 
Crown.  
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CONCLUSION 
  
As shown in this thesis, British military expenditures and public debt increased 
substantially due to the Seven Years’ War. The main reasons for this were unchecked 
spending and the addition of North America as a major theater of war. The war became the 
trigger towards a new fiscal practice by the British as they moved to utilize public debt as the 
main source for funding wars. The scale and scope of warfare only increased following the 
war, and it became a field test for deficit spending in future major conflicts involving Great 
Britain. Though the war ended with Britain receiving Canada from France as part of the 
peace treaty, Canada increased the financial burden in the long term by forcing the British to 
occupy and defend a huge expanse of land. The British colonies were heavily populated and 
continued to support colonial militias to protect their borders, but the borders of Canada were 
nearly defenseless after the French military evacuated the territory. Thus, Britain began to 
look for other options to pay for their new acquisitions to the empire.  
Following the end of the war, Britain replaced France as the dominant power in North 
America. By doing so, American colonists assumed that they could continue to expand their 
territory to the west. However, Parliament issued the Proclamation of 1763, prohibiting 
European expansion west of the Appalachian Mountains. Colonists believed that the war was 
fought to allow settlements on disputed territory. Instead, Britain realized that the war was an 
expensive undertaking, considering the few immediate economic gains it made. British 
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politicians insisted that new taxes should be imposed on the American colonies to help pay 
off the national debt. Lord Chesterfield, advisor and ally of William Pitt, wrote that the 
colonies were expected to pay the stamp duty because the war had been undertaken on their 
behalf, and therefore, the colonies deserved to pay their part.
138
 Britain borrowed the 
unprecedented sum of £58 million to pay for the Seven Years’ War, doubling the national 
debt.
139
 Most importantly, only £5.3 million was eliminated by 1775, roughly twelve years 
later.  
By the beginning of the American Revolution, Britain’s fiscal-military state began to 
show signs of strain. Britain realized that the colonies were becoming wealthy. The trade 
between Britain and the thirteen colonies was fluid and profitable. As a result, Britain looked 
to the colonies as a source of revenue to help pay for the high national debt, which had 
largely been created by frontier warfare intended to protect the colonies from French 
encroachment. Britain began to spread the costs of the war among the component parts of the 
Empire, which offended American colonists as new taxes were imposed on a relatively 
autonomous region. Though India and other areas of the Empire faced much higher levels of 
taxation and exploitation, the American colonies were used to preferential treatment. While 
the British believed that the colonies ―owed‖ the mother country money for the protection 
she provided, the American colonists saw it differently. Americans protested the new taxes 
and regulations placed on them by the British government. Soon, the colonists would call for 
representation in the Parliament in order to protect their interests. Though there were many 
other causes for the American Revolution, none were held more dearly by Americans than 
the principle of ―taxation without representation.‖ Finally, Americans revolted, took up arms, 
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and created a unified governmental structure to govern the colonies independently of Britain. 
Therefore, the American revolt added to a debt that the Seven Years’ War had helped to 
create, leading to a victory for the Americans. As a result, Britain gradually lost its hegemony 
in the Western Hemisphere, even though her empire had yet to reach its full potential 
globally. 
What were the main causes of the increased military spending and incurred public 
debt during and after the Seven Years’ War? Transportation was a key problem that affected 
all other factors. Since armies and soldiers need to be moved from one place to another, 
traveling to different areas of the globe became problematic and expensive. Beyond the 
soldiers, transporting military supplies was necessary and costly especially when sent to 
North America. Land transportation was a problem as well. On the North American 
continent, large expanses of forests and wilderness increased costs dramatically when 
compared with the ease of travel on the European continent.  
 When added to the overall costs of the war, Native Americans placed increasing 
strains on the British military, both in explicit and implicit costs. It is the first time that 
British officials treated directly with native tribes using the King’s finances. Both sides 
hoped to gain something from the encounter, and the Indians quickly learned that profit was 
made when dealing with Europeans. As the war continued, British military tactics were 
forced to change because of wilderness constraints and the Native Americans impact on 
transportation and maneuvers. These tactical changes caused larger forces to be divided into 
smaller contingents of men traveling with more officers. As officers’ pay was higher than 
enlisted men, costs to supply and pay a smaller group of men increased.  
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Despite the fact that that Britain suffered from higher and higher debt arising from the 
Seven Years’ War and other causes, the British economy thrived, and eventually Britain 
gained a decisive victory over France in 1815. In the early 21
st
 century, the United States can 
conceivably continue its debt build-up and still remain dominant in the global market. 
However, when will that debt become unmanageable? Can America shoulder a debt burden 
of trillions of dollars while remaining dominant militarily? Military conflicts always involve 
significant costs, and any attempt to fight major conflicts without spreading out the cost of 
the war via a combination of taxation and borrowing would be precarious at best. Over-
reliance on public debt can lead to a pattern of fiscal behavior that will be difficult to change, 
a dependence of sorts, whereas the attempt to fund the conflict via taxation alone can lead to 
societal disharmony and even chaos. Ultimately Britain found the balance and emerged as the 
military-fiscal superpower of the 19
th
 century. In the short-run, though, she lost a significant 
section of her empire to a rebellion sparked by the Seven Years’ War.
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